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Justice Deferred is Justice Denied:
We Must End Our Failed Experiment in
Deferring Corporate Criminal Prosecutions
PeterR. Reilly*
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, deferred prosecution
agreements are said to occupy an "importantmiddle ground" between
declining to prosecute on the one hand, and trialsor guilty pleas on the
other A top DOJ official has declared that over the last decade, the
agreements have become a "mainstay" of white collar criminal law
enforcement; a prominent criminal law professor calls their increased
use part of the "biggest change in corporate law enforcement policy in
the last ten years."
However, despite deferred prosecution'sapparent rise in popularity
among law enforcement officials, this Article sets forth the argument
that this alternative dispute resolution vehicle makes a mockery of the
criminal justice system by serving as a disturbing wellspring of
unfairness, double standards, and potentialabuse ofpower This Article
concludes by recommending that Congress pass legislation to halt the
DOJ's ability to use deferred prosecution agreements in the context of
corporate criminal law enforcement. The Article suggests that if this
goal cannot be realized, these agreements will continue to greatly
compromise the pursuit of justice, consistency in the rule of law, and
basic notions offairness.

. Associate Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. Harvard Law School
(J.D.); Georgetown University Law Center (LL.M.); Hewlett Fellow in Conflict Resolution
and Legal Problem-Solving, Georgetown University Law Center (2002-2005). I am grateful
for the opportunity to receive helpful feedback on an earlier version of this article from scholars
and practitioners at several events (including a Faculty Works-in-Progress presentation at Texas
A&M School of Law, a business breakfast at the UCLA School of Law Lowell Milken Institute
for Business Law and Policy, and the American Association of Law Schools ADR Works-inProgress Conference at Southwestern School of Law). I also wish to thank Cynthia Alkon,
Sahar Aziz, Ellen Deason, Milan Markovic, Matt Runkel, the librarians at Texas A&M School
of Law, and the staff of the BYU Law Review, all of whom have made extremely helpful
contributions to this project. Of course, all errors are my own.
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INTRODUCTION

On December 12, 2012, the New York Times editorial page
stated the following:
It is a dark day for the rule of law. Federal and state authorities have
chosen not to indict HSBC, the London-based bank, on charges of
vast and prolonged money laundering, for fear that criminal
prosecution would topple the bank and, in the process, endanger
308
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the financial system. They also have not charged any top HSBC
banker in the case, though it boggles the mind that a bank could
launder money as HSBC did without anyone in a position of
authority making culpable decisions.'

Instead of indictment and prosecution, HSBC was invited to join
what some call "Club Fed Deferred" 2-a
club that has a large
corporate membership 3-by entering into a deferred prosecution
agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice wherein the bank
would (1) pay money through forfeiture and other penalties, (2)
work to enhance its internal controls, and (3) submit to the
oversight of an external monitor for a period of five years.4 In
assessing this end result, the New York Times editorial commented:
When prosecutors choose not to prosecute to the full extent of the
law in a case as egregious as this, the law itself is diminished. The
deterrence that comes from the threat of criminal prosecution is
weakened, if not lost.... [O]nce criminal sanctions are considered
off limits, penalties and forfeitures become just another cost of
doing business, a risk factor to consider on the road to profits.'
My own reaction to the disposition of the case was more in line
with that of Professor Jimmy Guruld, a former enforcement official
at the U.S. Treasury Department, who said that deferred
prosecution in a case like HSBC makes a "mockery of the criminal
justice system."'
1. Editorial, Too Big to Indict, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 12, 2012, at A38.
2. Janet Novack, Club Fed, Deferred, FORBEs (Aug. 24, 2005, 8:40 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/2005/08/24/kpmg-taxes-deferred-cz-jn-0824beltway.html.
3. See Pub. Citizen's Cong. Watch, Justice Deferred: The Use of Deferred and NonProsecution Agreements in the Age of 'Too Big To Jail', PUB. CITIZEN 7-23 (July 8, 2014),
available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ustice-deferred-too-big-to-jail-report.pdf
(discussing how the U.S. Department of Justice has entered into deferred prosecution and/or
non-prosecution agreements with numerous corporate entities, including Barclays Bank PLC,
UBS, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, MetLife, the Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC
("RBS"), and JPMorgan Chase & Co.).
4. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank USA
N.A. Admit to Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Violations, Forfeit $1.256 Billion in
Deferred
Prosecution
Agreement
(Dec.
11,
2012),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hsbc-holdings-plc-and-hsbc-bank-usa-na-admit-anti-moneylaundering-and-sanctions-violations.
5. Too Big to Indict, supra note 1.
6. Ashley Post, HSBC Might Pay $1.8 Billion Fine in Money-Laundering Settlement,
INSIDE COUNSEL, (Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/12/06/hsbcmight-pay-18-billion-fine-in-money-laundering.
Professor Guruld suggested that law
enforcement agencies would have a stronger impact if they indicted individuals. As Gurul6 put
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At the time, I thought the HSBC agreement would surely be the

&

final low point in a two-decades-long experiment in deferring
7
prosecution of alleged corporate criminal wrongdoing. I thought
the case would be the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back,
prompting swift and resolute reform, including bringing corporate
deferred prosecutions to a well-deserved end. Since that time,
however, deferred prosecution has been applied across the full
spectrum of corporate conduct, generally falling into six categories of
violations or statutes, including various types of fraud and trade
offenses; the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act; the Controlled
Substances Act; the False Claims Act; and the Food, Drug
Cosmetic Act.8
We know "that criminal charges or potential criminal charges
against corporations are almost always resolved by a negotiated
9
resolution rather than through litigation." While these negotiations
0
can result in guilty pleas,' prosecutors may also choose to resolve
the matters using Deferred Prosecution Agreements ("DPAs") and
Non-Prosecution Agreements ("NPAs"). While DPAs and NPAs are
largely similar in form and substance," this Article will focus on
it, "That would send a shockwave through the international finance services community. It
would put the fear of God in bank officials that knowingly disregard the law." Id.
7. See, e.g., David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecutionand Non-Prosecution Agreements
and the Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REv. 1295, 1295-1300 (2013)
(discussing DOJ's use of a non-prosecution agreement in the Upper Big Branch mining
disaster, a case where twenty-nine miners died and where the Mine Safety and Health
Administration found more than 300 violations of the Mine Safety and Health Act). NPAs are
similar in many respects to deferred prosecution agreements. See infra note 11.
8. 2013 Mid-Year Update on Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) and
Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs), GIBSON DUNN

19-21 (July 9, 2013), available at

2

http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/ 013-Mid-Year-Update-CorporateDeferred-Prosecution-Agreements-and-Non-Prosecution-Agreements.aspx.
9. Barry J. Pollack & Annie Wartanian Reisinger, Lone Wolf or the Start of a New Pack:
Should the FCPA Guidance Represent a New Paradigm in Evaluating Corporate Criminal
Liability Risks?, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121, 125 (2014).
10. "95% percent of all federal criminal cases (and well over 90% of cases involving
organizational defendants) are resolved by guilty pleas." JULIE R. O'SULLIVAN, FEDERAL
WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND MATERIALS 37 (5th ed. 2012); see also Cynthia Alkon, The

U.S. Supreme Court's Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining: The Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 562 (2014); Robert P. Burns, What Will We Lose if the Trial

Vanishes?, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 575 (2011); Criminal Cases, U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/HowCourtsWork
/CriminalCases.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2015).
11. One important difference is that DPAs are filed by the DOJ in federal court with a
charging document and are subject to judicial approval. NPAs, on the other hand, are simply
letter agreements between the DOJ and the entity subject to the agreement. Regarding NPAs,
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DPAs, with the understanding that the observations and conclusions
put forth herein are applicable to both.
In a September 2012 speech before the New York City Bar
Association, then-Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer declared
that over the last decade DPAs have "become a mainstay of white
collar criminal law enforcement."12 Professor Julie O'Sullivan appears
to concur, calling their increased use part of the "biggest change in
corporate law enforcement policy in the last ten years . . . ."
Moreover, federal prosecutors have come to rely heavily on such
agreements:'" since 2000, the U.S. Department of Justice has
entered into 283 publicly disclosed agreements."5 The U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission also uses deferred prosecution in its
corporate enforcement regime, having entered into seven such
agreements since 2010.6 Of the 290 agreements that the DOJ and
the SEC have entered into since 2000, more than half (152) have
been made since January 1, 2010. These agreements have led to
monetary penalties totaling more than $42 billion.' 7
there is no public filing of charges, and they are not subject to judicial review. See
Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice, to
Heads of Dep't Components & U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Dep't of Justice 1 n.2 (Mar. 7, 2008),
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/ default/files/dag/legacy/2008/03/20/morforduseofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf.
12. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice, Address at the New
York
City
Bar
Association
(Sept.
13,
2012),
transcript
available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/ speeches/2012/crm-speech-1209131.html.
13. Julie R. O'Sullivan, How ProsecutorsApply the 'Federal Prosecutions of Corporations"
ChargingPolicy in the Era of Deferred Prosecutions, and What That Meansfor the Purposesof the
Federal Criminal Sanction, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29, 77 (2014) ("The biggest change in
corporate law enforcement policy in the last ten years has been the plunge in criminal
convictions of large organizations, and the DOJ's consistent use of [deferred prosecution]
agreements to dispose of criminal wrongdoing.").
14. See Morford, supra note 11. Typically, both DPAs and NPAs require the corporate
entities to (1) fully cooperate in the government investigation by disclosing all relevant facts;
(2) pay a fine; (3) put into place (or bolster existing) policies and procedures to ensure
compliance; (4) self-monitor to ensure adherence to the DPA or NPA provisions, or retain an
external monitor that ensures adherence thereto; (5) waive any and all possible legal defenses;
and (6) in the case of a DPA, to not deny the "Statement of Facts" appended to the
agreement. See Harry First, Branch Office of the Prosecutor: The New Role of the Corporationin
Business Crime Prosecutions, 89 N.C. L. REv. 23, 47 (2010).
15. 2014 Mid-Year Update on Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) and
Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs), GIBSON DUNN (July 8, 2014), available at
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2014-Mid-Year-Update-CorporateNon-Prosecution-Agreements-and-Deferred-Prosecution-Agreements.pdf
16. Id.
17. Id.; see also Uhlmann, supra note 7, at 1311.
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According to the DOJ, DPAs are said to occupy an
"important middle ground" between the stark, binary choice of
either prosecution (i.e., going to trial or accepting some kind of
plea agreement) or declination (i.e., walking away and doing
nothing).' 8 Moreover, it is important that DPAs not be confused
with plea bargaining. A plea bargain is essentially a negotiated
deal between the government and a defendant: if the government
agrees to reduce the charges or the severity of the sentence (or
both), the defendant will then agree to plead guilty." The key
difference is that in plea bargains, defendants ultimately accept
guilt 2o and conviction.21 With DPAs, on the other hand, there are
neither guilty pleas nor convictions.
Instead, DPAs are negotiated contracts 22 between the
government and targeted entities. 23 In most agreements, the
18.

See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL

§

9-28.200

8

(2014),

9 2
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title / mcrm.h
tm#9-28.200; see also Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution
Deferred? Judicial Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L.
REv. 1863, 1869 (2005) ("Deferred prosecution offers prosecutors an intermediate option
between declination and plea bargaining, as deferrals exact sanctions while circumventing the
collateral consequences of a conviction.").
19. See Michael Nasser Petegorsky, Note, Plea Bargaining in the Dark: The Duty to
Disclose Exculpatory Brady Evidence During Plea Bargaining, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3599,
3607 (2013) ("Plea bargaining occurs before the start of the trial and usually takes the form of
a series of offers and counteroffers between a prosecuting attorney and the defendant and his
attorney. There are two broad categories of plea negotiations, each of which general entails
concessions on the part of both the prosecution and the defendant: charge bargaining and
sentence bargaining. In charge bargaining, the defendant agrees to plead guilty in exchange for
the dropping of some charges or the decrease in their severity. In sentence bargaining, the
prosecution agrees to recommend a lesser sentence in return for the guilty plea. These
categories are not mutually exclusive, and many plea agreements will contain elements of
both.") (citations omitted).
20. Note, however, that an Alford plea involves a "no-contest" plea where the
defendant does not admit guilt, but nevertheless accepts a conviction. See generally Stephanos
Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of
Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1361 (2003).
21. See Greenblum, supra note 18 ("A guilty plea [in a plea bargain] results in a
conviction and collateral consequences attach no differently than if the offender had been
convicted in a trial.").
22. See Wilson Meeks, Corporate and White-Collar Crime Enforcement: Should
Regulation and Rehabilitation Spell an End to CorporateCriminal Liability?, 40 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 77, 80 n.16 (2006) ("DPAs are essentially contracts between the government
and a corporate criminal in which the government agrees not to prosecute a corporation in
return for a list of concessions.").
23. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Perspectives on CorporateCriminal Liability25 (Wash. Univ.
in St. Louis Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-01-02, 2012),
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company agrees: (1) to an admission of wrongdoing; (2) to
cooperate with the government and disclose all relevant facts in
ongoing investigations, including those in which corporate agents
and employees might be a target; (3) to pay monetary fines and
penalties; (4) to put into place (or bolster existing) compliance
programs; (5) to implement a self-monitoring program in order to
ensure adherence to various provisions of the agreement, or to
retain an external monitor that ensures adherence thereto; (6) to
agree to a waiver of the statute of limitations, as well as the right to
a speedy trial; and (7) to agree to a provision stating (a) that if the
company breaches the agreement, it will then be subject to
prosecution, and (b) that the agreement's statement of facts
(including admission of guilt) will be admissible.24 In exchange for
all this, the DOJ agrees to hold off on prosecution. In the end, if
all elements of the DPA are successfully achieved, the initially
accused party can move forward without fear of further legal
consequences regarding the matter in question. 25
This Article is divided into four parts: Part I will discuss (1) the
history of DPAs; and (2) the possibility that DPAs, by foreclosing
opportunities for trials, jury verdicts, and appellate court decisions,

available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1980346 ("DPAs do not
ordinarily result in an immediate agreement to refrain from criminally prosecuting the
corporation. Instead, they effectively place the corporation under government supervision for a
specified period of time and defer the decision whether to actively pursue criminal charges
pending a determination whether the corporation will successfully fulfill the terms and
conditions of the agreement. . . . Although [DPAs] almost invariably involve exacting some
concession from the corporation such as payment of a fine or restitution, these exactions are a
product of ad hoc decisions by prosecutors about the most effective and efficient means to
resolve a case through negotiated agreement rather than through formal punishment imposed
by a court upon conviction.").
24. See O'Sullivan, supra note 13, at 53. Note that many agreements go beyond these
more basic provisions. See F. Joseph Warin & Peter E. Jaffe, Commentary, The DeferredProsecutionjigsaw Puzzle: A Modest Proposalfor Reform, 19 ANDREWS WHITE COLLAR CRIME
REP., Sept. 2005, at 3, 5 (suggesting that "[o]ne of the most appealing aspects [of deferred
prosecution agreements] is the ability to tailor each one according to the specific needs of the
respective parties, with both sides bargaining for what they hold most dear").
25. See William S. Laufer, Corporate Prosecution, Cooperation,and the Trading of Favors,
87 IOWA L. REV. 643, 645-47 (2002). Professor Laufer suggests that law enforcement within
the corporate context oftentimes translates into "a brand of negotiated compliance" where
"reciprocal promises" are made, and where companies cooperate and accept responsibility "in
exchange for mitigation, exculpation, or absolution." The professor uses language of
negotiation theory as he refers to this "bargained-for exchange" or "trading of favors[] with an
arsenal of sanctions in the background." Id.
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might interfere with the important process of clarifying the
boundaries of the law.
Part II will discuss (1) the collateral consequences
surrounding traditional criminal conviction, including suspension,
debarment, and exclusion; (2) to what extent prosecutors should,
in making charging and other decisions, anticipate and/or
attempt to prevent those collateral consequences; and (3) a brief
history of respondeat superior liability and why companies tend to
favor DPAs over going to trial.
Part III will discuss (1) whether prosecutors have too much
power, leverage, and control in deciding whether, when, and how
DPAs will be used to resolve a given matter; (2) the issue of a
"revolving door" between criminal enforcement agencies and private
law practice, and its possible impact on prosecutorial charging
decisions; and (3) the extent to which prosecutors are (a) deciding to
pursue companies instead of individuals, (b) are focusing on
reforming corporate "culture" instead of punishing misbehavior, and
(c) are using DPAs to extract a "pound of flesh" from an alleged
wrongdoer in instances where such action might not be warranted.
Part IV concludes with the recommendation that Congress
should pass legislation to halt the DOJ's ability to use DPAs in the
context of corporate criminal law enforcement.
I. THE RISE OF DPAs

A. DPAs: From 1914 to the Present
DPAs emerged in the early 1900s as a way to address non-serious
misdemeanor charges, such as retail theft, especially when committed
by juveniles or first-time offenders. 2 6 As one commentator notes,
their use "is rooted in small measures to protect vulnerable persons
in society."

27

The Chicago Boys'

Court implemented deferred

prosecution in 1914 in the hope that juvenile offenders would not
be labeled and stigmatized as "criminals ,"28 and the Judicial
Conference formally endorsed the use of DPAs beginning in 1947.29
26. Kristie Xian, Note, The Price ofjustice: Deferred ProsecutionAgreements in the Context
ofIranianSanctions, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 631, 642-43 (2014).
27. Id. at 642.
28. Greenblum, supra note 18, at 1866.
29. Center for Health and Justice at TASC, No Entry: A National Survey of Criminal
justice Diversion Programsand Initiatives 16 (Dec. 2013).
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It was common to combine deferred prosecution with communitybased counseling, training, and job-placement programs to further
assist the offender and help him or her avoid a future life of crime. 0
In 1976, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration issued
a grant to the National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies
(NAPSA) in order to develop national standards for programs that
administer pretrial diversion programs. 3 ' The following year, the
DOJ promulgated standards for deferral of prosecution, citing three
principal objectives: "[(1)] To prevent future criminal activity among
certain offenders by diverting them from traditionalprocessing into
community supervision and services, [(2)] To save prosecutive and
judicial resources for concentration on major cases; and [(3)] To
provide, where appropriate, a vehicle for restitution to communities
and victims of crime." 3 2
In analyzing the first two of these three objectives, a plain
reading would suggest that the DOJ designed the deferrals for
application to individuals rather than organizations or entities (see
objective (1)), and for application to small or medium-sized cases
rather than "major" cases (see objective (2)). Nevertheless, it is clear
that, over time, the DOJ decided to utilize the agreements to resolve
possible criminal misconduct involving corporate and other business
entities (i.e., something other than "individuals"), and matters that
could be considered "major" cases, as will be discussed below.
One of the earliest uses of DPAs in the corporate context
occurred in 1994 when Mary Jo White, then the United States
Attorney for the Southern District of New York, entered into a DPA

30. Note, PretrialDiversion from the Criminal Process, 83 YALE L.J. 827, 827 (1974)
("Pretrial diversion is a formalized procedure authorized by legislation, court rule, or, most
commonly, by informal prosecutorial consent, whereby persons who are accused of certain
criminal offenses and meet preestablished criteria have their prosecution suspended for a three
month to one year period and are placed in a community-based rehabilitation program. The
rehabilitation program may include counseling, training, and job placement. If conditions of
the diversion referral are satisfied, the prosecution may be nolle prossed or the case dismissed;
if not, the accused is returned for normal criminal processing.").
31. Center for Health and Justice at TASC, supra note 29.
32.

U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 18,

§

9-22.010 (emphasis added); see also

Model Penal Code: Sentencing § 6.02A (Discussion Draft No. 4 2012) (stating that the
"primary purposes of deferred prosecution are to facilitate the offender's rehabilitation and
reintegration into the law-abiding community and the restoration of crime victims and
communities, while avoiding the stigma and collateral consequences associated with criminal
charges and convictions").
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with Prudential Securities." While that agreement helped blaze a
trail for other prosecutors to negotiate pretrial diversion agreements,
the DOJ initially used the agreements quite sparingly: from 2000
through 2004, the DOJ entered into an average of approximately
four agreements per year.34 Starting in 2005, however, the number of
agreements increased to an average of twenty-eight agreements per
year,35 with peak years in 2007 (with thirty-nine filings), 2010 (with
thirty-nine filings), and 2012 (with thirty-seven filings).3 6
This dramatic increase is likely due to the many positive effects of
resolving matters through a DPA, including (1) allowing companies
to avoid the stigma (and other negative consequences) that might
flow from a criminal indictment or trial; 7 (2) minimizing the
likelihood of collateral damage to innocent third parties (such as job
losses resulting from company closures, etc.);

8

(3) enabling the

collection of large fines, thereby leading to punishment for the
alleged wrongdoer and restitution for victims;" (4) mandating
specific reforms within the company and controlling how future
business is conducted; 4 0 and (5) monitoring company behavior to
ensure conformity with the terms of the agreement.4 1 Indeed, some
commentators suggest that prosecutors can achieve through DPAs,
"all

that they could win at trial

expenditure of time and resources."

.

.

. without the significant

42

33. Greenblum, supra note 18, at 1873.
34. 2013 Year-End Update on Corporate Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) and
Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs), GIBSON DUNN 1 (Jan. 7, 2014), available at
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2013-Year-End-Update-CorporateNon-Prosecution-Agreements-and-Deferred-Prosecution-Agreements.pdf
35. Id.
36. 2014 Mid-Year Update on CorporateDeferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) and
Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs), GIBSON DUNN 2 chart 1 (July 8, 2014), available at

http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2014-Mid-Year-Update-CorporateNon-Prosecution-Agreements-and-Deferred-Prosecution-Agreements.pdf; see also Uhlmann,
supra note 7, at 1311.
37. See Court E. Golumbic & Albert D. Lichy, The 'Too Big to jail" Effect and the Impact
on theJustice Department'sCorporateCharging Policy, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1293, 1314 (2014).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1315.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Barry A. Bohrer & Barbara L. Trencher, Prosecution Deferred: Exploring the
Unintended Consequences and Future of Corporate Cooperation, 44 AM. CluM. L. REv. 1481,
1483 (2007).
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Despite these advantages of DPAs, however, there are certain
drawbacks to both the agreements themselves and to the way in
which they are negotiated. U.S. District Court Judge Jed S. Rakoff,
who has handled numerous high-profile cases that have been
resolved through the use of deferred prosecution, provides an
accurate (and, to some, disturbing) picture of how the DPA
negotiation process moves forward, from beginning to end, from the
vantage point of the government. Acording to Judge Rakoff, once
you-you being the federal government-come to believe that
misbehavior may have occurred within a given company, counsel to
that company then
responds by assuring you that the company wants to cooperate
and do the right thing, and to that end the company has hired a
former Assistant U.S. Attorney, now a partner at a respected law
firm, to do an internal investigation. The company's counsel asks
you to defer your investigation until the company's own internal
investigation is completed, on the condition that the company
will share its results with you. In order to save time and resources,
you agree. Six months later the company's counsel returns, with a
detailed report showing that mistakes were made but that the
company is now intent on correcting them. You and the company
then agree that the company will enter into a deferred
prosecution agreement that couples some immediate fines with
the imposition of expensive but internal prophylactic measures.
For all practical purposes the case is now over. You are happy
because you believe that you have helped prevent future crimes;
the company is happy because it has avoided a devastating
indictment; and perhaps the happiest of all are the executives, or
former executives, who actually committed the underlying
misconduct, for they are left untouched.43
The judge concludes that such a process "is not the best way to
proceed" and states that "the future deterrent value of successfully
prosecuting individuals far outweighs the prophylactic benefits of
imposing internal compliance measures that are often little more
than window-dressing.4"4 I strongly agree; indeed, addressing
43. Jed S. Rakoff, Why Have No High Level Executives Been Prosecuted In Connection
With
The Financial Crisis?, CLS
BLUE SKY
BLOG
(Nov.
15,
2013),
http://cisbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/11/1 5/why-have-no-high-level-executives-beenprosecuted-in-connection-with-the-financial-crisis; see generally Elkan Abramowitz & Jonathan
Sack, The 'Civil-izing'of White-Collar CriminalEnforcement, N.Y. L.J., May 7, 2013, at 3.
44. Rakoff, supra note 43.
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possible corporate wrongdoing through DPAs has serious negative
implications for justice and fairness, many of which will be described
and analyzed in this article. My end goal is to convince readers that
DPAs-as well as the process through which they are negotiated and
implemented-make a mockery of the criminal justice system, and it
is therefore time to end our failed experiment in using them in the
context of corporate criminal wrongdoing.
B. Do DPAs Short Circuitthe Process of Clarifying the Boundariesof
the Law?
The jurisprudence of a given area of law is developed primarily
through litigation-meaning trials, jury verdicts, and appellate court
decisions. Importantly, litigated cases
provide judicial opinions regarding what conduct violates the
criminal laws and what does not. Thus, in addition to the criminal
statutes themselves, corporations and individuals ...

would have

guidance available to them in the form of judicial opinions
providing elaboration as to what specific fact patterns constituted
4
criminal behavior and, likewise, what fact patterns did not. 1
Obviously, when cases are resolved through DPAs, there is no
litigation, nor instructive legal precedent resulting therefrom. 46 As
Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow warns us: "When an authoritative
.

rule is necessary, . . . the courts must adjudicate and provide clear
guidancefor all.. .

While examining the text of previous DPAs can provide
companies with some guidance in clarifying the boundaries of
permissible legal conduct, such agreements do not provide binding
judicial precedent that can be legally relied upon by companies
facing similar circumstances. 4 8 Nevertheless, when the DOJ

&

45. Pollack & Reisinger, supra note 9, at 123-24.
46. One commentator suggests the DOJ has an incentive to use deferred prosecution
agreements in place of formal prosecution because, among other reasons, doing so
"strategically keep[s] the law underdeveloped in order to place more pressure on corporations."
Allen IL Brooks, Comment, A Corporate Catch-22: How Deferred and Non-Prosecution
Agreements Impede the Full Development of the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 7 J. L. ECON.
POL'Y 137, 139 n.22 (2010) (emphasis added).
47. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Essay, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the
Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REv. 485, 500 (1985) (emphasis added).
48. In addition to reviewing deferred prosecution agreements, interested parties can
glean guidance in different areas of the law from sources such as: (1) opinion procedure
releases in the area of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act; (2) business review procedures
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announces a deferred prosecution, the agency is thereby setting forth
guidance to the general public on how it might approach similar
cases in the future. If a company enters into a DPA based on a
particular set of facts, other individuals and companies will thereafter
know that the particular fact pattern "will be deemed by the DOJ to
cross the line of what is criminal."" Of course, because the DPA fails
to provide any kind of binding judicial precedent, "the DOJ is
under no obligation to treat the same conduct by different
corporations with any consistency, increasing the challenges of
corporate compliance and risk reduction."so

("BRP") in the antitrust context; and (3) advisory opinions in dealing with Medicare,
Medicaid, and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"). All of
these forms of guidance are similar to deferred prosecution agreements in that, while they can
be helpful and instructive, they do not have any precedential value. See Pollack & Reisinger,
supra note 9, at 144-47.
49. Id. at 126, 135 (discussing the lack of judicial opinions in the context of Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act enforcement, the authors state, "Due to the limited number of litigated
FCPA cases, the relatively small number of opinion procedure releases, and the lack of
information regarding enforcement policies from the Layperson's Guide, FCPA corporate
settlement documents became the true bread and butter of de facto agency 'jurisprudence'
guiding corporate conduct").
50. Id. at 127. In addition, the language set forth in these DPAs fails to give insight
regarding actions that do not cross the line into criminal activity. As Pollack and Reisinger put it:
Assume, for example, that the DOJ investigates corporation A for six different
potential criminal violations. Or, more likely in the modern world described above, a
corporation is so concerned about the possibility of criminal prosecution, it
voluntarily discloses to the DOJ six potential criminal violations. The company takes
the position that of these six arguable violations, three are, in fact, violations of the
law and three are not. The DOJ takes the position that five of the six constitute
criminal violations. Ultimately, as a product of negotiation, the DOJ agrees that the
fifth fact pattern did not cross the line and the corporation agrees that the fourth
fact pattern did. The DOJ and corporation A then enter into a deferred prosecution
agreement. Corporation A admits that it engaged in four sets of behavior that were
criminal, pays a large monetary penalty and agrees to increase its compliance
measures. The public reads this resolution and knows of four fact patterns that the
DOJ believes cross the line. The public does not learn of the fifth and sixth fact
patterns that the DOJ agreed, for the purposes of the negotiation, did not cross the
line. Had the cases been litigated, the public would have learned that the DOJ
charged the fifth fact pattern, but that this charge was dismissed by the court as
failing to state an offense or that corporation A was acquitted of this charge and
therefore that that fact pattern is not illegal, or, at a minimum, not likely to be
prosecuted again.
Id. at 126; see also F. Joseph Warin & Peter E. Jaffe, Rolling the Dice in Corporate Fraud
Prosecutions, LmG., Spring 2007, at 12, 15 (concluding "there is no rhyme or reason to the DOJ's
application of [DPAs and NPAs] to corporate entities"); Alyssa Ladd, Comment, The Catch-22 of
Corporate Cooperationin Foreign CorruptPracticesAct Investgations, 51 Hous. L. REv. 947, 960
(2014) (pointing out that the DOJ has "no concrete guidelines" for entering DPAs).
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II. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES AND RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR:
FORCES DRIVING DECISION MAKERS TO OPT FOR DPAs

A. CollateralConsequences: Suspension, Debarment, and Exclusion
Scholars John Gallo and Daniel Greenfield argue that "[t]he
characteristics of corporate criminal law result in an unusual state of
affairs: neither a corporation nor a federal prosecutor has an
incentive to take a corporate criminal case to trial."'
These authors suggest that, "[f]rom the corporation's
perspective, respondeat superior may render remote the odds of a
not-guilty verdict." 5 2 And "[f]rom the prosecutor's perspective,
debarment and exclusion upon conviction risk substantial injury to
and
employees, stockholders,
innocent third parties-i.e.,
They
consumers-and to the national economy as a whole.""
conclude that it is "no mystery" why the usage of DPAs has
"exploded" in the last two decades: "[B]oth corporations and the
government are virtually required to rely upon them in order to
circumvent the unfairness created by the combination of respondeat
superior liability and the collateral consequences of a conviction,
4
including disbarment and exclusion."1
If a corporation decides to go to trial and loses, it might face
debarment or exclusion. Debarment and exclusion occur in different
ways: First, a corporation can be debarred at the discretion of a
federal agency pursuant to the Federal Acquisition Regulations."
Sometimes called an "administrative debarment," 16 this kind of
debarment is carried out "to protect the Government's interest" by
ensuring that federal agencies conduct business only with companies

51. John N. Gallo & Daniel M. Greenfield, The Corporate CriminalDefendant's Illusory Right
to Trial- A Proposalfor Reform, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 525, 536 (2014).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 537; see also Pollack & Reisinger, supra note 9 ("[A]s reluctant as the DOJ has
become post-Arthur Andersen to prosecute criminal charges against corporations, corporations
have become even more reluctant to defend against such charges. The result is that criminal
charges or potential criminal charges against corporations are almost always resolved by a
negotiated resolution rather than through litigation.").
55. 48 C.F.R. § 99.402 (2013).
56. Rena Steinzor & Anne Havermann, Too Big to Obey: Why BP Should Be Debarred, 36
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 81, 97 (2011) (discussing how administrative
debarments and suspensions "are meant to protect the public interest, not to punish").
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that are "responsible."" Second, a company might face a "statutory
debarment," wherein a particular statute mandates that a convicted
corporation be debarred. Consider, for example, the Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7606 (a), which states:
No federal agency may enter into any contract with any person
who is convicted of any offense under section 7413(c) of this title
for the procurement of goods, materials, and services to perform
such contract at any facility at which the violation which gave rise
to such conviction occurred if such facility is owned, leased, or
supervised by such person."
Clearly, if a company relies on government contracts as a source
of projects and profits, such statutory debarment could dramatically
impact its bottom line, if not put it out of business altogether.59
Finally, a company might be excluded from participating in
certain federal programs. Consider, for example, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a7, dealing with exclusion from participation in Medicare and other
health programs, where there is "[m]andatory exclusion" (i.e., "The
Secretary shall exclude the following individuals and entities from
participation . . . .") for serious transgressions such as patient abuse,

felony health care fraud, and felony controlled substance convictions,
but merely "[p]ermissive exclusion" (i.e., "The Secretary may
exclude
the
following
individuals
and
entities
from
participation . . . .") for

less

serious

transgressions,

including

misdemeanor health care fraud, obstruction of an investigation or
audit, or misdemeanor-controlled substance conviction. 60
Debarment and exclusion can be devastating for a company.
With an estimated $460 billion spent in fiscal year 2013 alone,' the
United States government is the world's largest purchaser of goods
and services.62 For companies that depend heavily on contracts with

57. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.402(a), (b) (2013).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 7606(a) (2012).
59. Joel Androphy et al., The Intersection of the Dodd-FrankAct and the Foresgn Corrupt
PracticesAct: What All Practitioners, Whistleblowers Defendants, and Corporations Need to Know,
Alvoc., Summer 2012 at 19, 23 ("All the disadvantages of plea agreements, DPAs, and NPAs pale
in comparison to debarment from participation m ... government programs.").
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (emphasis added) (2012).
61. Danielle Ivory, Federal Contracts Plunge, Squeezing Private Companies, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 2014, at Bt.
62. Steinzor & Havermann, supra note 56, at 111.
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the federal government, exclusion and debarment can amount to a
corporate "death penalty." 6 3
But is it reasonable for criminal convictions to result in automatic
(and oftentimes quite large) civil sanctions? Moreover, does
debarment and similar sanctions have to be so rigid and one-size-fitsall? Elizabeth Ainslie, an experienced corporate compliance and
criminal defense litigator, suggests that laws imposing "mandatory,
automatic, and drastic civil sanctions in the wake of criminal
convictions are unnecessarily harsh and rigid."" According to
Ainslie, such laws also give federal prosecutors tremendous power
over companies, particularly those that are smaller in scale within
their respective industry, or that are not sole-source producers of
crucial goods or services. 6 She opines:
This regime gives government, and especially the federal
government, vast and irrationally shaped areas of power....
Defendant corporations .. . often feel forced to pay exceedingly
large settlements on the civil side, and to plead guilty to a carefully
orchestrated charge on the criminal side, simply to avoid "betting
the company" in a criminal trial, the outcome of which might mean
automatic exclusion from a federal program that provides a
significant portion of the company's livelihood. Moreover, the
smaller a portion of the relevant market the defendant occupies,
the disproportionately smaller its bargaining power with the
government. A major aircraft manufacturer, or even a small
pharmaceutical company which is the sole source of an important
drug, is much less susceptible to a disastrous criminal outcome than
is its much smaller or more generic competitor."
All of this begs the question, to what extent might we revisit
the rules and processes governing sanctions such as automatic
debarment? Perhaps there could be multi-layered processes
63. See Pollack & Reisinger, supra note 9 ("Conviction may lead to debarment, the
death penalty for a company that relies on government contracts, or exclusion, the death
penalty for a health care provider who receives payments from Medicare or Medicaid.").
64. Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting CorporationsRevisited: Lessons of the Arthur Andersen
Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 107, 110, 118 (2006) ("This coupling is most frequently
found in the government contracts arena, where Congress has in general decreed that those
who are convicted of defrauding the government will automatically be debarred from contracts
with the government. This may appear to be a rational decree at first blush, but . . . in practice
it leads to vast dislocations of power as between the Department of Justice and businesses that
deal with the government . ..
65. Id.
66. Id. at 118.
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regarding how such decisions are made and implemented, with
opportunities for more discretion on the part of regulators, and
opportunities for businesses to appeal civil sanctions before they
go into effect.67
B. Should ProsecutorsAttempt to Anticipate and Prevent Collateral
Consequences?
There is a valid regulatory interest in debarring and de-licensing
companies for serious corporate transgressions: it ensures that the
federal government does business only with "responsible" business
partners.68 But, unfortunately, it is not only the irresponsible business
partners that are impacted when a company is debarred. Numerous
other parties face collateral consequences, including employees,
stockholders, and, of course, customers who rely on the products
and services produced or provided by those businesses. Consider,
for example, a drug and medical device company that engages in
misconduct, resulting in the company's disbarment. When the
company can no longer receive reimbursements from Medicare or
Medicaid, that company's customers will be forced to find the
lifesaving and life-sustaining drugs and devices elsewhere. But what if
no other company produces the drugs or devices? Or what if other
companies step in to fill the market void but cannot ramp up
production quickly enough to meet consumer demand? Could it be
considered immoral or unconscionable to make completely innocent
consumers suffer such collateral consequences-consequences that
could even result in death?
I argue that it should not be the responsibility of federal
prosecutors to anticipate and prevent these kinds of consequences
when carrying out their duty of upholding the law and applying it

67. O'Sullivan, supra note 13, at 32 ("Prosecutors . .. don't want to be
responsible, for example, for the debarment from Medicare or Medicaid of companies
that offer life-saving drugs or medical devices. But the point is that the prosecutors are
not responsible: the rules governing the application of these collateral consequences are
the problem. In short, if collateral consequences create real concerns, they should be
addressed on their own terms by permitting regulators additional discretion in their
administration or otherwise altering the rules.").
68. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.103 ("Purchases shall be made from, and contracts shall be
awarded to, responsible prospective contractors only."). See also § 9.104-1 (listing factors
that define a responsible contractor); § 9.402 (a)-(b). See generally, Jessica Tillipman,
Suspension and Debarment: The Congressional War on Contractors, 45 GEO. WASH. INT'L

L. REv. 235 (2013).
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equally and fairly. Rather, I believe that such problems should be
addressed by the legislators who create the rules and laws
surrounding this issue, or by the regulatorswho work to implement
those rules and laws. Perhaps regulators could be given more
discretion to forego debarring or de-licensing companies that have
committed bad acts.69 Or perhaps the current laws, rules, and
policies setting forth the various terms of suspension, debarment,
and/or de-licensing (e.g., the length and severity of the actions and
penalties) need to be reassessed and possibly changed by
lawmakers."o

When we rely on prosecutors to attempt to prevent these kinds
of consequences, a double standard or "dual system of justice" is
thereby created in terms of which companies will be spared
prosecution." Specifically, it is only for those select companies that
can potentially cause serious collateral damage to innocent third
parties (e.g., large companies with great numbers of employees that
could potentially be laid off, large banks that are considered pivotal
to the national or international economy, or companies that are the
sole or nearly sole providers of vital services or products like lifesaving drugs or devices) that the DOJ will place a thumb on the
scale in favor of deferred prosecution rather than indictment. A
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) study discussed the
importance of this factor to prosecutors as they made
charging decisions:
that the potential harm that
[P]rosecutors explained . .
prosecution and conviction of health care companies can have on
innocent third parties may be a key factor in their decision on
entering into a DPA or NPA with these kinds of companies.
Federal law provides for health care companies convicted of certain
crimes to be debarred from--or no longer eligible to participate

69. Richard A. Epstein, The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2006
("[T]eams of state and federal regulators are now duty-bound to suspend the licenses and
permits under which the corporation does business. Thus, the corporation that has strong
protections against false convictions-proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of
the crime, the ability to examine evidence or cross-examine witnesses-is helpless to protect
itself.") (Emphasis added).
70. O'Sullivan, supranote 13, at 32.
71. See Xian, supra note 26, at 661 ("The continued use of deferred prosecution in the
corporate context creates a dual system of justice... . If you are an individual or small business
owner, you will be prosecuted . . . . However, if you are a bank official of a large, international
bank, you will be granted prosecutorial leeway and avoid criminal sanctions altogether.").
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in-federal health care programs. Prosecutors in one office said
that they chose to enter into DPAs and an NPA simultaneously
with five orthopedic device companies that provided kickbacks to
physicians because, combined, these companies comprised the vast
majority of the market for hip and knee replacements; therefore,
conviction and debarment of these companies would have severely
limited doctor and patient access to replacement hips and knees.72

And yet not all companies get this kind of treatment. Consider
the case of G&A Check Cashing, a small store in Los Angeles. In the
fall of 2012 (just prior to the HSBC settlement discussed at the
beginning of this article), the DOJ obtained guilty pleas from G&A
Check Cashing and two of its senior officers. G&A and its officers
were charged with laundering eight million dollars-a miniscule
amount compared to the billions of dollars allegedly laundered by
HSBC. Following their guilty pleas, both G&A officers were sent to
prison.7 ' As one scholar notes, "[t]he dramatically different
treatment of HSBC and G&A and their respective senior officers can
hardly be squared with any meaningful concept of 'equal justice
under the law.'"7 4

Professor O'Sullivan concludes that the only advantage to using
DPAs (instead of relying upon criminal indictment and a possible
conviction) is that deferring prosecution "permit[s] the government
to avoid blame for whatever collateral consequences may flow from a
corporate guilty plea-be it debarment from government
contracting, the de-licensing of the firm, or losses in revenue, jobs,
or shareholder value." 7 O'Sullivan states that such a "singular focus

72. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-636T, CORPORATE CRIME:
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON DOJ's USE AND OVERSIGHT OF DEFERRED PROSECUTION
AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS 9 (2009) (footnote omitted).
73. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Los Angeles Check Cashing Store, Head
Manager and Compliance Officer Sentenced for Violating Anti-money Laundering Laws (Jan.
14. 2013), http://www.justice.gov/usao/cac/Pressroom/2013/008.html (stating that G&A
Check Cashing paid a one million dollar fine, a manager was sentenced to five years, and the
compliance officer was sentenced to eight months).
74. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving in to
Wall Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1375 (2013).
75. O'Sullivan, supra note 13, at 77. See also Barry A. Bohrer & Barbara L. Trencher,
Symposium: Corporate, Criminality: Legal, Ethical, and ManagerialImplication: The Challenge
of Cooperation: Prosecution Deferred: Exploring the Unintended Consequences and Future of
CorporateCooperation, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1481, 1483 (2007) (suggesting that prosecutors
seek DPAs because, among other reasons, the prosecutors "escape the criticism that would
likely flow from the destruction of the corporate entity.").
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on collateral consequences" undermines the "fair and even-handed
administration of criminal justice.""
Moreover, this strong focus on collateral consequences might be
misplaced altogether, as scholars and experts now begin to question
the degree to which a company is truly harmed from the collateral
consequences that flow from indictment and conviction. In other
words, is the sky really falling? Do companies truly have legitimate
and compelling reasons to be afraid of indictment, or are their fears
somehow overblown? Our knowledge surrounding this question
seems to be quickly increasing. In 2012, then Assistant Attorney
General Lanny Breuer stated:
We are frequently on the receiving end of presentations from
defense counsel, CEOs, and economists who argue that the
collateral consequences of an indictment would be devastating for
their client.

. .

. I personally feel that it's my duty to consider

whether individual employees with no responsibility for, or
knowledge of, misconduct committed by others in the same
company are going to lose their livelihood if we indict the
corporation. In large multi-national companies, the jobs of tens of
thousands of employees can be at stake. And, in some cases, the
health of an industry or the markets are a real factor. Those are the
kinds of considerations in white collar crime cases that literally keep
me up at night, and which must play a role in
responsible enforcement. 7
Less than a year later, in 2013, Gabriel Markoff published an
article entitled Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the CorporateDeath
Penalty: Corporate Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First
Century7 8 in which he challenged prevailing notions regarding the
collateral consequences of convicting corporate entities. Using a
database of organizational convictions, Markoff comes to the
arguably surprising conclusion that, in the years 2001 to 2010, no
publicly traded company failed due to a conviction,7 9 and thus "the
76. O'Sullivan, supra note 13, at 77.
77. Breuer, supra note 12.
78. Gabriel Markoff, Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty:
CorporateCriminalConvictionsin the Twenty-First Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 797, 802 (2013).
79. Id. But see Elkan Abramowitz & Barry A. Bohrer, The Debate About Deferred and
Non-Prosecution Agreements, 248 N.Y. L.J., Nov. 6, 2012, at 3 ("While the reality is that
corporations may not face the type of collateral consequences suffered by Arthur Andersen,
there is no question that fighting criminal charges can have a tremendous impact on a
corporation's reputation and pocketbook.").
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risk of driving companies out of business through prosecutions has
been radically exaggerated." 8 0
I will leave it to historians and political scientists to help
determine why the DOJ seemed to turn a corner in its thinking on
this matter, but it is interesting to see the very different tone and
message delivered in a speech in early 2014, just months after the
publishing of Markoff's article, by Manhattan U.S. Attorney Preet
Bharara, who stated:
What I have found typically is that, in reality, as we had suspected,
the sky does not fall ... And so, this repeated Chicken Little
routine, I will tell you, begins to wear thin. And the result is that
we view with more and more skepticism and with more and more
doubt all the breathless claims of catastrophic consequences made
by companies both large and small.",

A cynic (or realist?) might contend, then, that corporations are
well aware that they could successfully survive indictment and even
conviction. Indeed, Archer Daniels Midland, Chevron, Exxon,
General Electric, Georgia Pacific, Hoffman LaRoche, Pfizer, and
Tyson are just a few of many U.S. companies that have been
convicted of serious violations, and yet still flourish. 82 It could be
argued, however, that it is nevertheless strategically wise for a
company to do or say whatever has to be done or said-including
making "breathless claims of catastrophic consequences"-in order
to obtain a DPA.83
80. Markoff, supra note 78.
81. Halah Touryalai, This Preet BhararaSpeech Should Scare All Big Banks, Especially
Citi,
FORBES
(Apr.
3,
2014,
1:41
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2014/04/03/this-preet-bharara-speechshould-scare-all-big-banks-especially-citi/. See also Mark Gongloff, Eric Holder: Actually, I
Meant to Say No Banks are Too Big to Jail, HUFFINGTON POST (May 15, 2013, 3:31 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/1 5/eric-holder-too-big-to-jail-n-3280694.htm
(describing testimony of Attorney General Holder at a congressional hearing; specifically, in
responding to the question of whether some banks were "too big to jail," Mr. Holder stated:
"Let me be very, very, very clear. Banks are not too big to jail. If we find a bank or a financial
institution that has done something wrong, . . .those cases will be brought").
82. See Russell Mokhiber, Crime Without Conviction: The Rise of Deferred and Non
Prosecution Agreements, CORP. CRIME REP. (2005) (discussing numerous major U.S.
companies that survived and thrived after having been convicted of serious crimes). See also
Randall D. Eliason, We Need to Indict Them: Deferred Prosecution Agreements Won't Deter
Enough Corporate Crime, 31 LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 22, 2008, at 54.
83. But see Joseph G. Block & David L. Feinberg, Look Before You Leap-DPAs, NPs,
and the Environmental Criminal Case, 9 ENvTL. ENFORCEMENT & CRIMES COMMITTEE

NEWSL., Apr. 2008, at 5, 7 (noting that while a deferred prosecution agreement "saves the
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C. RespondeatSuperior: Why CompaniesAvoid Trial and Seek Out DPAs
If a company is facing potential criminal liability, might it make
more sense to accept a DPA than to risk going to trial in the matter?
The standard for proving "[c]orporate criminal liability developed as
courts struggled to overcome the problem of assigning criminal
blame to fictional entities in a legal system based on the moral
accountability of individuals." 8 4 In 1909, the U.S. Supreme Court
decided New York Central dr Hudson River Railroad Company v.
United States, a case in which a railroad company was appealing its
conviction based on the conduct of an employee who violated
federal law while acting within the scope of his employment.8 1
In holding the company responsible, the Court stated: "[W]e see
no good reason why corporations may not be held responsible for
and charged with the knowledge and purposes of their agents, acting
within the authority conferred upon them. If it were not so, many
offenses might go unpunished.. .1."6

The Court noted that "the

great majority of business transactions in modern times are
conducted through [corporations, and to] give them immunity from
all punishment because of the old and exploded doctrine that a
corporation cannot commit a crime would virtually take away the
only means of effectually controlling the subject-matter and
87
correcting the abuses aimed at."

The Court then affirmed the conviction based on the tort
doctrine of respondeat superior liability:
Applying the principle governing civil liability, we go only a step
further in holding that the act of an agent, while exercising the
authority delegated to him ...

may be controlled, in the interest of

public policy, by imputing his acts to his employer and imposing
penalties upon the corporation for which he is acting ....

8

Professors Gallo and Greenfield suggest that the doctrine of
respondeat superior makes a quick and near-certain link between the

client from mandatory statutory debarment, . . . it may not protect against federal discretionary
debarment or suspension").
84. Michael Viano & Jenny R. Arnold, Corporate Criminal Liability, 43 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 311, 312 (2006).
85. New York Central v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 490-92 (1909).
86. Id. at 494-95.
87. Id. at 495-96.
88. Id. at 494.
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behavior of the agent and the corporation, stating, "Once there is
evidence that an employee engaged in criminal activity on the job,
the criminal case against the company may be 'virtually
bulletproof."'" 9 Indeed, according to Gallo and Greenfield, the
doctrine of respondeat superior can expose the corporate defendant
to criminal liability even where:
(a) the criminal behavior was perpetrated by a low-level, rogue
employee;
(b) the transgression took place without the knowledge of
upper-level management;
(c) the employee was explicitly instructed by the corporation
not to engage in the conduct;
(d) the conduct directly violated established company policy;
(e) the conduct failed to benefit the company;
(f) the company had in place a robust compliance program at
the time the transgression occurred; and
(g) the conduct was exposed by the compliance program.9 0
Professor O'Sullivan sums up the situation thusly: "the
respondeat superior standard has been expanded through common
law adjudication to the point where it is less a standard than a
guarantor of liability."' Such a situation, of course, can be
problematic for any company wishing to contest a criminal matter
through litigation, and some practitioners in this area of law argue
89. Gallo & Greenfield, supra note 51, at 529 (citing Preet Bharara, CorporationsCry
Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate
Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 53, 76 (2007)).
90. Id. (citing Lucian E. Dervan, Reevaluating Corporate CriminalLiability: The DOJ's
Internal Moral Culpability Standardfor Corporate CriminalLiability, 41 STETSON L. REV. 7
(2011); Bharara, supra note 89).
91. O'Sullivan, supra note 13, at 33 (emphasis added). See id. at 33-34 ("[IJntent may
be imputed to the corporation from a person distinct from the individual who committed the
actus reus of the crime . . . . Prosecutors need not identify the actual wrongdoer, as long as it
can be inferred that some person 'did it' within the organization. Inconsistent verdicts are
tolerated, under which corporations are convicted when all conceivable culpable agents have
been acquitted. And courts accept a 'collective knowledge' theory, under which no one person
knew all the facts demanded by statute, and the required knowledge can be pieced together
from what various people within the corporation knew . . .. [C]orporations can be held liable
even if they had in place good faith and generally effective (but not necessarily foolproof)
compliance systems designed to prevent and punish such wrong-doing.") (citations omitted).
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that the current doctrine is flawed. One such critic is criminal
defense litigator Elizabeth Ainslie, who argues:
There is .

.

. no reason why the doctrine of respondeat superior

should be imported in its totality into the criminal law. The
purpose of the doctrine on the civil side of the law is fairly clear: if
an employee injures a third party in the course of his duties on
behalf of an employer, that injured party should be able to obtain
economic compensation from the employer on whose behalf the
economic conduct occurred. On the criminal side, however, it
makes absolutely no sense to enable a jury to convict an entire
organization on the basis of conduct of a lower-level employee, nor
does it make sense to convict an organization on the basis of a
rogue employee's conduct where that conduct was contrary to a
92
genuine corporate policy.
Ainslie believes that one important fix could be for the Judicial
Conference of the United States to adopt a federal jury instruction
based on the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code
("MPC") § 2.07(1)(c)," which states: "[T]he commission of the
offense was authorized, requested, commanded, performed or
recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high
managerial agent acting on behalf of the corporation within the
94
scope of his office or employment."

92. Ainslie, supra note 64, at 120.
93. Id. at 119-120, 123 (pointing out that the law of the Fifth Circuit, where the
Arthur Andersen firm was prosecuted, essentially incorporated the rules of respondeat superior
from civil cases into criminal cases without significant modification. Moreover, the jury
instruction given by the judge in the Andersen case was derived from the federal common law,
rather than from a statute. Thus, according to Ainslie, the judge in the case instructed the jury
that "(1) Andersen was legally bound by the acts and statements of its agents made within the
scope of their employment; (2) although the agent in question must be acting with the intent,
at least in part, to benefit the partnership, it was not necessary that the agent's primary motive
was to benefit the partnership; (3) although the agent's criminal act must have related directly
to the performance of the agent's general duties for the partnership, it was not necessary for
the particular act itself to have been authorized by the partnership; (4) indeed, a partnership
may be held responsible for its agents' acts performed within the scope of their employment
even though the agents' conduct is contrary to the partnership's actual instructions or stated
policies; and (5) the agent in question need not be a high level or managerial agent in order
for his or her act to be attributable to the firm." Upon reflection, Ainslie's reaction to such a
jury instruction was, "This is the law, but in this respect, to quote Dickens' Mr. Bumble, the
law is an ass."). See generally Court's Instructions to the Jury at 4-5, United States v. Arthur
Andersen, No. 02-121 (S.D. Tex. June 5, 2002).
94. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c).
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The MPC defines "high managerial agent" as an officer "or any
other agent of a corporation or association having duties of such
responsibility that his conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the
policy of the corporation or association." 95 Moreover, the Code
provides an affirmative defense if a corporate defendant can show, by
a preponderance of the evidence, "that the high managerial agent
having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the
offense employed due diligence to prevent its commission." 9 6

'

Ainslie argues that adopting the MPC language, and
incorporating that language into federal jury instructions, would
make the federal government's position conform more closely with
the majority of states that have addressed the issue themselves,
whether through state statutes9 7 or through common law doctrine.98
Ainslie further argues that the federal judiciary, having allowed the
respondeat superior doctrine to "metastasize from the civil side onto
the criminal side," could and should work to "reverse the growth."99
Professors Joshua Greenberg and Ellen Brotman set forth
criticisms in a similar vein, opining that federal appellate courts do
not allow a corporation "to defend itself by showing that the
employee's conduct violated its compliance policy or a directive from
a superior."' 00 These scholars declare that, for numerous reasons,
strict vicarious criminal liability for corporations is "unfair, is bad
public policy, and should be abolished." 0
95. Id.

96. Id.

§ 2.07(4)(c).

92.07(5).

97. See, e.g.,

ALASKA STAT. § 11-16-130 (2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-305
(2004); MONT. CODEANN. § 45-2-311 (2009).
98. See, e.g., State v. Smokey's Steakhouse, Inc., 478 N.W.2d 361, 362 (N.D. 1991).
Note that some states have adopted standards that are even more strict than those set forth in
the Model Penal Code. See, e.g., State v. Adjustment Dep't Credit Bureau, 483 P.2d 687, 691
(Idaho 1971) (adopting a standard modeled after the Model Penal Code but refusing to adopt
the respondeat superior liability provision set forth in § 2.07(1)(a) of the Code). In other
jurisdictions, the state legislature has limited corporate criminal liability to very specific
circumstances or crimes. See, e.g., State v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 835 So.2d 230,
233-34 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000).
99. Ainslie, supra note 64, at 123.
100. Joshua D. Greenberg & Ellen C. Brotman, Strict Vicarious Criminal Liabilityfor
Corporationsand Corporate Executives: Stretching the Boundaries of Criminalization, 51 Am.
CiuM. L. REv. 79, 84 (2014).
101. The reasons include the following:
First, it subjects a corporation to criminal liability when a single rogue employee
engages in misconduct--even if the misconduct directly violates the corporation's
policies and occurs despite a rigorous compliance program. As a result, "a single
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errant employee can cause the downfall of a multi-national corporation and the loss
of thousands of jobs."
Second, it treats responsible corporations the same as corporations that fail to take
reasonable efforts to prevent misconduct. The two are not similarly situated,
however. Insofar as a corporation can be blameworthy, a corporation that has
implemented a robust compliance policy is less deserving of blame than is a
corporation that has failed to adopt a compliance policy. Yet strict vicarious criminal
liability treats the two equally.
Third, it reduces corporations' incentives to implement vigorous and effective
compliance policies, as the absence of such policies has no effect on whether a
corporation is subject to strict vicarious liability for its employees' criminal acts.
Indeed, strict vicarious criminal liability may actually deter corporations from having
robust compliance policies. When a compliance policy yields information about
criminal acts, that information can end up being used by the government to indict
the corporation. Corporations may decide that they are better off without
compliance policies that could produce evidence that would support strict vicarious
criminal liability.
Fourth, it does not serve any legitimate deterrent or retributive purpose because it
punishes corporations that not only did nothing wrong, but also took reasonable
steps to prevent misconduct by their employees. When a corporation whose
employee committed a criminal act had in place a robust compliance policy,
subjecting the corporation to strict vicarious criminal liability based on that act does
not serve to deter insufficiently vigorous compliance efforts. Likewise, a corporation
with a robust compliance policy in place did not do anything wrong, so no
retributive purpose is served by holding it criminally liable for its
employee's misconduct.
Fifth, it punishes innocent shareholders and employees, whereas the persons who are
actually responsible for the crimes could be punished without the unfair
consequences of holding the corporation criminally liable.
Sixth, when the employee who committed the misconduct is convicted of a crime,
convicting the corporation as well results in duplicative liability. This is inconsistent
with the doctrine of respondeat superior that underlies vicarious corporate criminal
liability. In the civil context, a tort plaintiff cannot obtain a full recovery from an
agent of a corporation and also recover from the corporation itself under a
respondeat superior theory; the corporation's "obligation is discharged when full
satisfaction is obtained against the agent." With strict vicarious criminal liability,
however, the corporation and the offending employee can each be punished for the
same cnme.
Seventh, it gives prosecutors too much power, as the threat of a prosecution based
on one employee's misconduct can force a corporation to enter into a deferred
prosecution agreement or a non-prosecution agreement, which itself may have
substantial consequences. Given "the profound impact of an indictment and the lack
of a defense to vicarious liability, the mere threat of criminal sanctions based on the
actions of an individual employee has been enough to compel corporations to settle
non-meritorious claims."
Eighth, and finally, civil liability for the corporation and prosecution of the offending
employee are sufficient to remedy the harm caused by an employee's misconduct.
Any physical or financial injury caused by an employee's misconduct can be
adequately compensated by holding the corporation liable in a civil case. There is no
need to take the additional step of subjecting the corporation to strict vicarious
criminal liability. Id. at 85-86 (citations omitted).
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I will leave it to other scholars to put forth proposals to reform
criminal liability in the context of corporate law.102 My objective
today is to attempt to convince the reader that the current state of
the law could easily lead counsel to believe that attempting to defend
a corporate client against criminal liability at trial is a risky
proposition indeed and that accepting an offer of deferred
prosecution might be very wise, even if it means agreeing to steep
demands placed from a hard-bargain-driving prosecutor on the other
side of the negotiation table.'o
III. UNCONSTRAINED PROSECUTORIAL POWER, REVOLVING
DOORS, AND LACK OF PUNISHMENT

A. UnconstrainedProsecutorialPower
Beginning in 1999, the DOJ issued four key memoranda setting
forth prosecution guidelines or principles underlying prosecutors'
charging decisions with respect to corporate enforcement. 104 Each
102. See, e.g., Gallo & Greenfield, supra note 51, at 544 (putting forth a proposal for
reform wherein an employee's malfeasance would "expose the corporation to criminal liability
only where the current common law elements are satisfied and at least some member of senior
management possessed the mens rea set forth in the underlying criminal statute. Our proposal
also incorporates an improved affirmative-compliance-program defense, permitting the
corporation to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the body of individuals
comprising senior management maintained and oversaw a robust compliance program
designed to prevent the type of conduct charged"); see also Greenberg & Brotman, supra note
100, at 95 (arguing that the doctrines of strict vicarious criminal liability for corporations and
corporate executives have "unfair and pernicious consequences" which could be mitigated by
"(i) requiring that a statute clearly mandate strict vicarious criminal liability before such liability
is imposed and (ii) allowing an affirmative defense that the corporation had a reasonable
compliance policy and that the responsible corporate officer made reasonable efforts to
implement that policy").
103. O'Sullivan, supra note 13, at 34 ("It is exceedingly difficult to conceive of the
criminal process that applies to corporations today as truly 'adversarial.' In reality, a variety of
circumstances make it very difficult for public companies, especially those in regulated
industries or those who do significant business with the government, to mount any meaningful
resistance to a criminal investigation.") (citation omitted).
104. See Memorandum from the Dep't of Justice, Eric H. Holder, Deputy Attorney Gen., Bringing
Charges
Against
Corporations
(June
16,
1999),
available
at
http://w.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/1999/charging-corps.PDF
["Holder
Memo"]; Memorandum from the Dep't of Justice, Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen.,
Principles of Fed.
Prosecution
of Bus.
Orgs.
(Jan.
20, 2003), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003jan2
0_privwaiv-dojthomp.authcheckdam.pdf ["Thompson memo"]; Memorandum from the Dep't of Justice,
Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attomey Gen., Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Orgs., available at
http://wwwjustice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2007/07/05/mcnultymemo.pdf
["McNulty
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memo built upon and refined the reasoning and arguments of its
"Filip
so-called
in the
culminating
finally
predecessor,
R.
Mark
General
Memorandum," issued by then Deputy Attorney
Filip. Officially titled "Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations" ("Principles of Prosecution"), the memo was
codified in the United States Attorney's Manual on August 28,
2008. 1o The Principles of Prosecution instruct federal prosecutors to
consider the following nine factors when determining whether or not
to charge a corporation or business entity:
(1) The nature and seriousness of the offense, including the
risk of harm to the public, and applicable policies and
priorities, if any, governing the prosecution of corporations
for particular categories of crime;
(2) The pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation,
including the complicity in, or the condoning of, the
wrongdoing by corporate management;
(3) The corporation's history of similar conduct, including
prior criminal, civil, and regulatory enforcement actions
against it;

(4) The corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of
wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the
investigation of its agents;
(5) The existence and adequacy of the corporation's preexisting compliance program;
(6) the corporation's remedial actions, including any efforts
to implement an effective corporate compliance program or
to improve an existing one, to replace responsible
management, to discipline or terminate wrongdoers, to pay
with the relevant
cooperate
and to
restitution,
government agencies;
(7) collateral consequences, including disproportionate harm
to shareholders, pension holders, and employees not proven

memo"]. For a thoughtfuil discussion of the various revisions made by the DOJ to each successive
memorandum, see Dane C. Ball & Daniel E. Bolia, Ending a Decade of FederalPmecutorialAbus in the
CorporateCiminalChargng Decision,9 WYO. L. REv. 229,239-49 (2009).
105. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL §§ 9-28.000
through 9-28.1300 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/corpcharging-guidelines.pdf.
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personally culpable, as well as impact on the public arising
from the prosecution;
(8) the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals
responsible for the corporation's malfeasance; and
(9) the adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory

enforcement actions.

06

Reading the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations might lead one to believe that much of the harm
caused by the respondeat superior corporate criminal liability regime
has been mitigated-that the government has found a way, through
its practice of making charging decisions, to consider factors other
than the principles of vicarious liability set forth in the New York
Central case, discussed previously. To a certain extent, that is true;
the government has provided a way to ensure that other factors will
be considered during the charging process.
But these factors will be incorporated only if the prosecutor
chooses to do so, and only to the extent that he or she wishes. This
is because while federal prosecutors are obligated to review the
Principles of Prosecution to see how they might apply within a
particular case, the U.S. Attorneys' Manual states explicitly that the
Principles do not serve to create any legal rights whatsoever for the
parties involved: "The Manual provides only internal Department of
Justice guidance. It is not intended to, does not, and may not be
relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural,
enforceable at law by any party in a matter civil or criminal." 0 7
Moreover, the Filip Memo makes it clear that federal prosecutors
retain significant charging discretion, notwithstanding the various
factors set forth in the Principles of Prosecution: "In making a
decision to charge a corporation, the prosecutor generally has
substantial latitude in determining when, whom, how, and even

106. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL: PRINCIPLES OF
FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
9-28.300 through 9-28.1100
(2008)
[hereinafter
PRINCIPLES
OF
PROSECUTION],
available
at

$§

http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/ usam/title9/28mcrm.htm.
107. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 1-1.100 (updated May
2009) (emphasis added), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foiareadingroom/
usam/tidel/Imdoj.htm/.
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0
whether to prosecute for violations of federal criminal law."
Indeed, the last sentence of the Filip Memo states, "Nor are any
limitations hereby placed on otherwise lawful litigative prerogatives
of the Department of Justice," thereby emphasizing yet again the
wide and largely unconstrained discretion given to prosecutors in

carrying out their charging duties.' 0 9

The bottom line is that, given the current respondeat superior
corporate criminal liability regime, it would be quite
understandable for a defense attorney to be wary if a client has
been targeted by the DOJ regarding possible criminal liability.
Despite the seemingly reasonable and fair guiding principles set
forth in the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations, there is no way of knowing to what extent those
principles will influence prosecutors' decisions.
Moreover, if the doctrine of respondeat superior gives
companies the incentive to dispose of a given matter by agreeing to
a DPA, the system thereby loses one of the strongest elements in
place to ensure that prosecutors behave in a fair and judicious
manner toward the accused: the trial by jury. As the U.S. Supreme
Court tells us, "The purpose of a jury is to guard against the
exercise of arbitrary power-to make available the commonsense
judgment of the community as a hedge against the overzealous or
mistaken prosecutor.""1 0 Thus, with the highly decreased likelihood
of cases going to trial, what protections are in place to prevent the
negative impacts that can result from a prosecutor's wrongful
accusation, or overly-aggressive charge?
Finally, if a company believes that going to trial is too risky due
to the doctrine of respondeat superior, this severely weakens the
company's "BATNA," or Best Alternative to a Negotiated

108. See Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy U.S. Att'y Gen., to Heads of Dep't
available at
2008),
28,
(Aug.
4
at
Att'ys,
U.S.
&
Components
8 28 20 08
.pdf.
http://www.justice.gov/dag/readingroom/dag-memo-0
109. See id. at 21. See also Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized CorporateProsecutions, 97 VA.
L. REV. 1775, 1778 (2011) ("Federal prosecutors possess extraordinarily wide discretion as
compared to their counterparts around the globe.").
110. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968)). See also Erik Paulsen, Note, Imposing Limits on
ProsecutorialDiscretion in Corporate Prosecution Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434,
1457 (2007) ("Without the fear of trial. . .there is no assurance that the prosecutor is
acting in a judicious manner.").
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Agreement. "' In other words, the option of going to trial would
ordinarily present companies with a reasonable alternative to the
prospect of accepting a DPA offer from the government. However,
if a company believes it realistically cannot go to trial because doing
so would have devastating consequences for the company, then the
government has substantial (if not overwhelming) power not only in
convincing the company to agree to a DPA, but also in negotiating
the terms of the DPA-power that could potentially result in
arbitrary or unfair deal terms for the company."'
B. The "Revolving Door" and Its Possible Impact on Prosecutorial
ChargingDecisions
As one example of how prosecutors might have too much
discretion in the area of charging, consider the question of whether
prosecutors might be influenced in their charging decisions by their
post-DOJ job prospects.
It is difficult to answer this question with much certainty; former
Department of Justice litigator Joseph Covington has spoken
candidly of what he perceives to be a revolving door between the
DOJ and private law practice. Commenting on his particular area of
expertise, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Covington says, "this is
good business for law firms .. . for accounting firms . .. for

111. ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 100 (1991) (defining BATNA as "the standard against
which any proposed agreement should be measured. That is the only standard which can
protect you both from accepting terms that are too unfavorable and from rejecting terms it
would be in your interest to accept"); see generally CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL
NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT (6th ed. 2009).
112. See Greenblum, supra note 18 at 1885 ("The corporate offender's unique
vulnerability to adverse publicity and collateral consequences . . . calls into question whether
the choice to enter into deferral is really a choice at all."). See also Paulsen, supra note 110, at
1436 ("It has become increasingly clear that the government holds all the cards in negotiations
over these [deferred prosecution] agreements. As long as the threat of prosecution lingers over
a company, the corporation is compelled to agree to the prosecutor's terms, vesting nearly
absolute power in the government's hands. Unable to risk a potential indictment, the
corporation is thus left at the mercy of the prosecutor."); Elizabeth R. Sheyn, The
Humanization of the CorporateEntity: Changing Views of Corporate Criminal Liability in the
Wake of Citizens United, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 26 (2010) ("Commentators generally
express concern regarding the government's use of DPAs and NPAs. One significant and
frequently raised issue is the bargaining imbalance between corporations and the government.
Many scholars argue that 'prosecutors abuse their powerful bargaining position' in forcing
organizations to agree to 'overly intrusive-and in some cases arguably arbitrary-terms."')
(citation omitted).
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consulting firms ... and Justice Department lawyers who create the
marketplace and then get [themselves] a job.""'
It is difficult to know exactly how much the door might
"revolve" between the DOJ and private law firms, or how big the
pay differential can be between the two types of jobs, as this
information is rarely made public (at least with respect to the law
firm positions). One example is the case of Mark Mendelsohn, who
was Deputy Chief of the DOJ Fraud Section and the attorney
responsible for overseeing all DOJ investigations and prosecutions
under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) from 2005 to
2010."1 Upon leaving DOJ in 2010, Mendelsohn began building an
FCPA practice with a private law firm in Washington, D.C. for a
reported annual salary of $2.5 million."
William M. Palmer, an attorney practicing in Boston,
Massachusetts, who was a federal prosecutor in the 1990s, argues the
current situation demonstrates that there has been "regulatory
capture by the elites .

.

. in part instantiated by the fact that many

DOJ attorneys plan to take white-shoe law firm jobs that pay
extraordinarily well."" 6 Palmer suggests that because nearly all the

future clients will be companies and company executives, "[i]t is
hard to get potential clients to warm up to you when you have a
history of aggressively putting their contemporaries in prison.""
Finally, there is Judge Jed Rakoff, who wrote an article
entitled, The FinancialCrisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives
Been Prosecuted?"' Judge Rakoff says he "completely discount[s]"
the argument that "no such prosecutions have been brought
because the top prosecutors were often people who previously
represented the financial institutions in question and/or were
people who expected to be representing such institutions in the

113. Nathan Vardi,

The Bribery Racket,

FOlURES,

June

7,

2010, available at

http://www.forbes.com/global/2010/0607/companies-payoffs-washington-extortionmendelsohn-bribery-racket.html.

&

114. Mark F. Mendelsohn, Partner Profile, Law Firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton
at
available
LLP,
Garrison
counsel/mark-f-mendelsohn.aspx.

http://www.paulweiss.com/professionals/partners-and-

115. Vardi, supra note 113.
116.

William M. Palmer, Esq., Comment to Too Big to Indict, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11,

2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/opinion/hsbc-too-big-to-indict.html.
117. Id.
118.
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future:
the so-called
'revolving
door."'"..9
However,
he
subsequently makes an argument as to why a prosecutor might be
influenced by that very revolving door when deciding between
two different kinds of cases to prosecute:
I would venture to guess that the cases involving the financial crisis
were parceled out to Assistant [US attorneys] who [were also
responsible for] insider-trading cases. Which do you think an
assistant would devote most of her attention to: an insider-trading
case that was already nearly ready to go to indictment and that
might lead to a high-visibility trial, or a financial crisis case that was
just getting started, would take years to complete, and had no
guarantee of even leading to an indictment? Of course, she would
put her energy into the insider-trading case, and if she was lucky, it
would go to trial, she would win, and, in some cases, she would then
take a job with a large law firm. And in the process, the financial
fraud case would get lost in the shuffle.12 0
I believe Judge Rakoff sets forth a strong case for how
prosecutors might in fact let post-DOJ job prospects impact their
prosecution decisions, i.e., how the so-called revolving door might
be influencing prosecutors' decisions. He cites an example of how a
prosecutor's decision might be influenced in order to make his or
her resume look more appealing to prospective employers, which
some might say is less pernicious than having a decision influenced
because the prosecutor used to represent the institutions in question
or because the prosecutor expected to represent the institutions in
the future. However, in all three scenarios, the idea of a "revolving
door" appears to be playing a role.' 2 1
C. PursuingCompanies Instead of Individuals?Reforming Corporate
'Culture'Instead of PunishingMisbehavior?
1. Pursuingcompanies
In his article, Judge Rakoff offers several "influences" that he
believes have had the effect of limiting prosecutions of high-level
executives. Of the factors he mentions, he suggests the one that is
the "most subtle . . . the most systemic . . . and arguably the most

119. Id.
120. Id. (emphasis added).
121. Id.
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is the shift that has occurred, over the past thirty

years or more, from focusing on prosecuting high-level individuals to
focusing on prosecuting companies and other institutions."l 22
Specifically, Rakoff points out that while prosecutors have charged
companies with various crimes for more than a century, "until
relatively recently, such prosecutions were the exception, and
prosecutions of companies without simultaneous prosecutions of their
managerialagents were even rarer." 23
This is an aspect of recent corporate criminal cases that one
might find quite disturbing: in going after the company, where are
the simultaneous prosecutions of managerial agents? As Judge Rakoff
notes: "In recent decades, . . . prosecutors have been increasingly
attracted to prosecuting companies, often even without indicting a
single individual."1 24
Judge Rakoff points out that this shift in focus is often
"rationalized as part of an attempt to transform 'corporate
cultures,"' thereby (hopefully) leading to reduced future criminal
activity. As a result, the government has turned to using DPAs,
which the judge believes "has led to some lax and dubious behavior

122. Id.
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Id. See also, Jesse Eisinger, Seeking Tough justice, but Settling for Empty Promises,
N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/07/seeking-toughjustice-but-settling-for-empty-promises/ (pointing out that charges were not brought against
individuals in either of two highly-publicized cases involving HSBC and Toyota, both of which
were resolved through DPAs. The writer relies on the research of Professor Brandon Garrett to
suggest that "follow-up charges against executives are rare. Disturbingly, in the biggest
corporate convictions, which are ostensibly more serious actions, charges against individual
executives are even rarer." The writer concludes that the current situation provides incentives
for top company executives who see or suspect wrongdoing within their organization to
"[d]evelop a powerful case of incuriosity, cancel meetings with the auditors, send the
compliance officers on vacation to the Aleutian Islands. Revel in ignorance. And you stand an
excellent chance of skating"); Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, BNP Paribas Admits
Guilt and Agrees to Pay $8.9 Billion Fine to U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2014,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/30/bnp-paribas-pleads-guilty-in-sanctions-case
(pointing out that while BNP agreed to plead guilty to various crimes and to pay an $8.9
billion penalty, no BNP employees had been criminally charged in the matter); and Deferred
Prosecution Agreements: A Better Option Than Indictment?, METROPOLITAN CORPORATE
COUNSEL (NORTHEAST EDITION), May 2008, http://www.nmmlaw.com/pdf/prosagr.pdf

(in an interview with the Editor, former U.S. Attorney Bryan Blaney states that DPAs are most
often "used by prosecutors to obviate criminal indictments against individuals when the
government sought to obtain financial restitution and restrict conduct, but did not view
imprisonment as a necessary penalty.").
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on the part of prosecutors, with deleterious results."' 5 Clearly, the
judge seems to favor prosecutions over DPAs:
Just going after the company is . . . both technically and
morally suspect. It is technically suspect because, under the
law, you should not indict or threaten to indict a company
unless you can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that some
managerial agent of the company committed the alleged crime;
and if you can prove that, why not indict the manager? And
from a moral standpoint, punishing a company and its many
innocent employees and shareholders for the crimes committed
by some unprosecuted individuals seems contrary to
elementary notions of moral responsibility.1 2 6
Interestingly, even the DOJ's Principles of Federal Prosecution
of Business Organizations suggest that prosecution of individuals is
to be a priority over prosecuting companies:
Where a decision is made to charge a corporation, it does not
necessarily follow that individual directors, officers, employees, or
shareholders should not also be charged. Prosecution of a
corporation is not a substitute for the prosecution of criminally
culpable individuals within or without the corporation. Because a
corporation can act only through individuals, imposition of
individual criminal liability may provide the strongest deterrent
against future corporate wrongdoing. Only rarely should provable
individualculpability not be pursued . . . .127
This language begs the question, why, in recent years, has the
DOJ seemed to go against its own charging guidelines by shifting
the focus of enforcement action from high-level individuals to
companies?1 2 Judge Rakoff states that if the financial crisis was
caused by fraudulent misconduct, then "the failure of the
government to bring to justice those responsible . . . bespeaks
weaknesses in our prosecutorial system that need to be
addressed."1 2 9 It appears that a key factor in causing such

125. Rakoffssupra note 43.
126. Id.
127.

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-28.200.B

(2008) (emphasis added).
128. Indeed, former Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer states unequivocally that
"the strongest deterrent against corporate crime is the prospect of prison time for individual
employees." Breuer, supra note 12.
129. Rakoff, supranote 43.
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weaknesses in the prosecutorial system-whether in prosecuting
crimes of fraud or crimes in other areas-might be the shift from
targeting high-level individuals to targeting companies and
reforming corporate culture. 130
2. Reforming CorporateCulture
What is the fundamental role of a federal prosecutor in the
3
context of corporate criminal law? Is it to "seek justice"?' ' Is it to

somehow reform "corporate culture" so that companies and the
people who run them will be less likely to commit crimes in the
future? Is it to prosecute and punish illegal activity? Is it a
combination of all three of these?
Attorneys Peter Spivack and Sujit Raman suggest that the DOJ's
view of the role of corporate criminal enforcement has undergone a
fundamental shift: "In a post-Enron world, DOJ officials appear to
believe that the principal role of corporate criminal enforcement is to
reform corrupt corporate cultures-that is, to effect widespread
structural reform-rather than to indict, to prosecute, and to
punish." 3 2 The authors add that "[b]y focusing more on prospective
questions of corporate governance and compliance, and less on the
retrospective question of the [company]'s criminal liability, federal
prosecutors have fashioned a new role for themselves in policing,
and supervising, corporate America." 3 1
130. But see Elkan Abramowitz & Jonathan Sack, Why So Few Individuals? Government's
Prosecution of Corporate Misconduct, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 5, 2013 ("Whatever the specifics in a
given case, individuals should often not be charged with offenses to which a company has
pleaded guilty-either because the government's legal theory was flawed, the government
lacked sufficient proof or the individuals were simply not guilty. . . . [I]n the majority of cases
in which corporations settle charges, individuals are most likely not charged because the
government has reasonably concluded that its theory and evidence are not sufficiently strong
to establish individual liability.").
131. See generally Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors'Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 607, 642 (1998) ("[A] prosecutor is a representative of, as well as a lawyer for, a
government entity that has several different, sometimes seemingly inconsistent, objectives in
the criminal context. Of these, convicting and punishing lawbreakers is only one, and it is no
more important than the others, such as avoiding the punishment of innocent people and
ensuring that people are treated fairly. As the government's surrogate, the prosecutor's job is
to carry out all these objectives and resolve the tension among them.").
132. Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the 'New Regulators': Current Trends in
Deferred ProsecutionAgreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 161 (2008) (emphasis added).
133. Id. (emphasis added). See generally Brandon L. Garrett, StructuralReform Prosecution, 93
VA. L. REv. 853, 886-87 (2007) ("Like the explosion of public interest law firms in the late 1960s and
early 1970s pursuing structural reform, the DOJ has now consciously adopted a structural reform
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To decide whether or not to charge a corporate entity, federal
prosecutors are advised to "ensure that the general purposes of the
criminal law-assurance of warranted punishment, deterrence of
further criminal conduct, protection of the public from dangerous
and fraudulent conduct, rehabilitation of offenders, and restitution
for victims and affected communities-are adequately met." 3 4 As
Professor Peter Henning explains, however, the approach taken
toward individuals, as compared to that taken toward corporations,
seems to be different in at least one important aspect:
The criminal law is retrospective in nature, asking whether proof of
the defendant's act and mental state at the time of the offense are
sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. For
corporations, however, simply assessing past conduct is not as
important as determining whether the organization is in need of
reform to ensurefuture compliance.13

This is related to what Professor
"galvanizing deterrence," which she says

Julie

O'Sullivan

calls

requires forward-looking rehabilitation and incapacitation in the
form of disciplining the wrongdoing agents, reforming the policies
and procedures that promoted or sanctioned wrongdoing,
implementation or improvement of a compliance program that will
prevent and deter future crimes, and a revamping of the corporate
culture that encouraged or tolerated criminal wrongs.'3 6
Practically speaking, what does this mean for a corporate entity?
It can result in DPAs that contain provisions requiring a company to
(1) change compensation or sales practices and/or incentive
structures; (2) modify (or even bring to an end) consulting and/or
contracting agreements previously made with other businesses,
individuals, and entities; (3) change the membership and/or
structure of the company's board of directors; (4) replace certain
company officers, auditors, or other employees; (5) establish new (or
improve already-existing) compliance and ethics programs within the

litigation strategy in the wake of Enron and dozens of other high-profile corporate malfeasance scandals.
A structural reform paradigm is different from the traditional role of prosecutors, which focuses on
seeking convictions.") (footnote omitted).
134.

U.S. ATrORNEYS'

MANUAL,

supranote 18,

§

9-28.300(B).

135. Peter J. Henning, CorporateCriminal Liability and the Potentialfor Rehabilitation,
46 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1417, 1435 (2009) (second emphasis added).
136. O'Sullivan, supra note 13, at 44.
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company; and (6) terminate certain lines of business.' Some legal
experts wonder aloud if such provisions go too far or if the
prosecutors demanding the changes have adequate expertise in
business as well as law.m Indeed, Professor John Coffee argues that
DPAs have "intruded deeply into corporate governance" and that
many of the changes required of companies amount to
"experimentation in corporate governance by a prosecutor who lacks
any empirical basis for believing that these reforms will reduce the
risk of future recidivism."'
Top DOJ officials suggest that changes mandated through DPAs
result in much-needed culture reform. As one official put it, "along
with the other tools we have, DPAs have had a truly transformative
effect on particular companies and, more generally, on corporate
40
culture across the globe."1

The question is do we really want our federal prosecutors to
focus on reforming corporate culture rather than on indicting,
prosecuting, and punishing? Moreover, how do we currently ensure
that federal prosecutors have the necessary training and experience to
effectively carry out that mission? Are all of them trained in business
as well as the law? After all, the role of the prosecutor "is generally
understood to be limited to determining whether a given case merits
federal prosecution and, if so, which charges should be brought.
137. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Deferred Prosecution:Has It Gone Too Far?, NAT'L L. J., July 25,
2005, at 13; Garrett, supra note 133, at 936 ("Federal prosecutors have stepped far outside of their
traditional role of obtaining convictions, and, in doing so, seek to reshape the governance of leading
corporations, public entities, and ultimately entire industries."); Paul E. McGreal, Corporate

ComplianceSurvey, 64 BuS. LAw. 253, 260-61 (2008) (discussing how DPAs can force governance
reforms upon companies, including requiring additional independent directors on the company
board, or requiring the creation of a new board committee or the reconfiguring of an alreadyexisting board committee); P.J. Meitl, Who's the Bor? Prosecutorial Involvement in Corporate

America, 34 N. KY. L. REv. 1, 12-13 (2007) (describing how DPAs "go to the heart of corporate
governance matters,
company to add an
practices, to change
the board); Dennis

normally reserved for the Board of Directors" with examples such as requiring a
independent board member, to cease private client compensation and benefits
the management of the company, and to require the addition of new seats on
J. Ventry, Jr., Cooperative Tax Regulation, 41 CONN. L. REv. 431, 475-76

(2008) (describing DOJ's DPA "with KPMG as part [of a] multi-billion dollar criminal tax fraud
investigation. . . . The . . . agreement . . . impose[d] . . . restrictions on KPMG's tax practice,
including requiring the firm to[(1)] cease (with limited exceptions) its private client tax practice as
well as its compensation and benefits practice; [(2)] refrain from developing, marketing, selling, or
implementing pre-packaged tax products; and [(3)] restrict severely its tax preparation services").
138.

See Daniel R. Alonso, Use Caution in Negotiating Deferred Prosecution Agreements,

N.Y. L.J., Mar. 1, 2006, at 4.
139. Coffee, supra note 137.
140.
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With deferred prosecutions, however, prosecutors have been
tempted 'to experiment with corporate governance in ways that
exceed their competence or entitlement."'l41
Moreover, while the DOJ is touting the ability of DPAs to
transform corporate culture "across the globe," 142 the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) has come to the
conclusion that the DOJ is simply not in a position to evaluate DPA
effectiveness in combating crime.
The GAO concluded that the
"DOJ cannot evaluate and demonstrate the extent to which DPAs
and NPAs . . . contribute to the department's efforts to combat
corporate crime because it has no measures to assess their
effectiveness,"'44 and "therefore, it could be difficult for DOJ to
justify its increasing use of these tools."u14 In a similar vein, a report
issued by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) that addressed Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
enforcement issues stated that the "actual deterrent effect" of DPAs
"has not been quantified."146
If these assessments by the GAO and the OECD are accurate
and the DOJ is neither in a position to evaluate the effectiveness of
DPAs nor to measure how much such agreements lead to real and
lasting corporate reform, then it seems that the DOJ's contention
that deferred prosecution has had a "transformative effect" on
corporate culture throughout the world is speculative at best.
Finally, critics argue that DPAs simply do not offer the same
deterrent effect as do criminal prosecutions, that "the approach of
letting corporations escape with monetary fines as long as they
promise to self-regulate creates no disincentives for corporations to

141. Golumbic & Lichy, supra note 37, at 1312-13 (footnote omitted) (quoting Coffee,
supra note 137, at 13); see also O'Sullivan, supra note 13, at 69-70 ("[DPAs] transform
prosecutors into regulators, raising serious questions of competency and legitimacy (not to
mention over-deterrence and waste of scarce government resources).").
142. Breuer, supra note 12.
143. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-110, CORPORATE CRIME: DOJ
HAS TAKEN STEPS TO BETTER TRACK ITS USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION
AGREEMENTS, BUT SHOULD EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS (2009).

144. Id.at 20.
145. Id.
146. OECD WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE
OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN THE UNITED STATES para. 54 (2010).
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abstain from fraud or white-collar crime."'"' It seems reasonable to
arrive at the conclusion that if the threat of criminal liability is
essentially removed, then corporate decision makers will be more
willing to engage in criminal misconduct.' 8 As one commentator
sums it up: "DPAs may make it financially viable for corporations to
bear the risk of criminal business practices due to financial gains
made from such practices without the threat of an indictment."

49

D. Are ProsecutorsExtractinga Pound of Flesh When it's Not
Warranted?
From a defense perspective, a deferred prosecution is
preferable to indictment, but companies would nonetheless prefer
a declination. The question is whether prosecutors will offer
deferred prosecution when they otherwise would have declined to
prosecute.s 0 SEC Chair Mary Jo White, during her previous
tenure as partner at a private law firm, was clear in her position
that DPAs should be limited "to situations where [the
government] certainly would have indicted otherwise for all the
right reasons on their part."''
While one can only speculate as to whether or not that is always
what occurs, it seems that many people believe the worst: "Most
observers .

.

. contend

that diversion

agreements

actually

have

replaced declinations, providing prosecutors with an opportunity to
extract a pound of flesh when previously they would have had to
settle for nothing."' 5 2 And a top DOJ official bolsters this
now
states publicly, "Companies
contention when he
know. . . that they will be answerable even for conduct that in years
147. Ellis W. Martin, Comment, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: 'Too Big tojail'and the
Potential of Judicial Oversight Combined with Congressional Legislation, 18 N.C. BANKING
INST. 457, 468 (2014).
148. Eliason, supra note 82 ("With the threat of criminal liability effectively off the table,
corporate executives may be more willing to skate aggressively close to the line-or to jump
over it. If the prospect of real criminal sanctions against the company is removed, then
engaging in criminal activity becomes just another dollars-and-cents decision.").
149. Martin, supra note 147, at 469; see also Eric Lichtblau, In Justice Shift, Corporate
Deals Replace Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2008, at Al.
150. See Eugene Illovsky, Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements: The Brewing
Debate, 21 CRIM. JUST., Summer 2006, at 36, 37 ("[S]ome question whether the government
is getting deferred prosecution agreements in cases it would otherwise decline.").
151. Interview with Mary Jo White, Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York, New
York, CORP. CRIME REP., Dec. 12, 2005, at 11, 14 (emphasis added).
152. Spivack & Raman, supra note 132, at 188.
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past would have resulted in a declination."13 Surely this official was
not trying to suggest that the government would try to take
advantage of the situation by "extracting an unjustified pound of
flesh," but, nevertheless, the possibility for such an occurrence
seems quite real and deeply troubling.
The question then becomes how do we know whether this is
actually taking place? While we cannot read the minds of
prosecutors, the next best thing might be to get an honest reading of
the situation from current or former highly placed, experienced
prosecutors within the DOJ. Mark Mendelsohn, who was Deputy
Chief of the DOJ Fraud Section and the attorney responsible for
overseeing all DOJ investigations and prosecutions under the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act from 2005 to 2010, is just such a
person. Mendelsohn stated in an interview that there is a "danger"
posed by DPAs because it can be "tempting" for DOJ attorneys "to
seek to resolve cases through DPAs or NPAs that don't actually
constitute violations of the law."l5 4 When asked if the DOJ did not
have the option of deferred prosecution, but instead had to choose
between prosecution and declination, Mendelsohn stated, "If the
Department only had the option of bringing a criminal case or
declining to bring a case, you would certainly bring fewer cases."' 5
Moreover, former U.S. Deputy Attorney General Larry
Thompson stated in a speech that, "While I believe that most
government officials are fair and high-minded in making these sorts
of determinations [to prosecute], there are forces at work that can
create a temptation for even the most sensible of these prosecutors
to deviate sometimes." 5

6

And what are these "forces" at play?

Thompson suggests they vary and can include prosecutors who wish
to "make names for themselves through highly publicized
prosecutions,"'1 7 as well as prosecutors who are "stupid, malevolent,
or a cowboy or cowgirl who just wants to try a case and does not
want to be reasonable."

55

153. Breuer, supra note 12 (emphasis added).
154. Interview with Mark Mendelsohn, Partner, Paul Weiss, Washington, D.C., CoP.
CRIME REP., Sept. 13, 2010, at 11, 14 (print edition only).
155. Id. at 15.
156. Larry D. Thompson, Keynote Speech: The Reality of Overcriminalization, 7 J.L.
ECON. & POL'Y 577, 582 (2011).
157. Id.
158. Larry D. Thompson, The Blameles Corporation,47 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1251, 1254(2010).
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Considering how much discretion prosecutors have through the
Principles of Prosecution, the insights that these former high-ranking
DOJ officials provide are troubling indeed. Thompson confirms this
notion with his conclusion that while "these problems afflict only a
very small minority of federal prosecutors, . . . it only takes one bad

apple in one big prosecution to have a significant, deleterious effect
on the justice system." '"
And this is especially troubling given that, if a case ultimately
ends up going to trial for whatever reason, prosecutors can use a
previously-signed DPA to secure a conviction as the vast majority of
DPAs require the company to admit to misconduct."o As two
practicing attorneys, both former federal prosecutors, observe, "the
government . .. [is] armed with the company's admission and all the

evidence obtained from its cooperation, making conviction virtually
a foregone conclusion."' 6 ' And this power is compounded by the fact
that most DPAs include a provision giving the government the
exclusive and non-reviewable right to determine whether a breach of
the agreement has occurred.1 62 For example, the government's DPA
with Saena Tech Corporation reads:
159. Larry D. Thompson, In-Sourcing Corporate Responsibility for Enforcement of the
Foreign CorruptPracticesAct, 51 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 199, 210 n.79 (2014).
160. Mythili Raman, the acting chief of DOJ's Criminal Division, appeared before the
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House Financial Services Committee in
2013 and stated that "regardless of the resolution-deferred prosecution, non prosecution or a
guilty plea-the company must fully acknowledge it's [sic] criminal wrongdoing and may not
retract that." Russell Mokhiber, Raman Defends Deferred and Non Prosecution Agreementsfor
Major Corporate Crime Cases, CORPORATE CRIME REPORTER, May 22, 2013,
222
013/.
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/ramanhousetestimony5
DPAs
corporate
the
232
of
that,
contends
Garrett
Brandon
Despite that testimony, Professor
and NPAs he reviewed, 12 percent failed to admit guilt to or accept responsibility for the
wrongdoing. Id.
161. Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a PostEnron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice,"43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1105
(2006); see Michael Yangming Xiao, Note, Deferred/non ProsecutionAgreements: Effective Tools
to Combat CorporateCrime, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 233, 241 (2013) ("[S]hould a
case ultimately go to trial, prosecutors can use previous DPAs and NPAs as unfair shortcuts to
secure a conviction.").
162. See Xian, supra note 26, at 644-45 ("These agreements often include
provisions in which the government is listed as the sole decider as to whether a breach has
occurred. As a result, the question of whether a company actually breached the agreement
is not subject to an objective trier-of-fact's judgment, but posed to the government,
which might have an ancillary interest in protecting the status of 'successful' deferred
prosecution agreements.") (footnote omitted); see also Candace Zierdt & Ellen S.
Podgor, Corporate Deferred Prosecutions Through the Looking Glass of ContractPolicing,
96 KY. L.J. 1, 14 (2007) ("Although negotiated resolutions offer enormous economic
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If during the Term of this Agreement, the Office determines, in its
sole discretion, that the Company or Mr. Kim have (a) committed any
felony under U.S. federal law subsequent to the signing of this
Agreement, (b) at any time provided in connection with this
Agreement deliberately false, incomplete,
or misleading
information, or (c) otherwise breached the Agreement, the
Company and Mr. Kim shall thereafter be subject to prosecution
for any federal criminal violation of which the Office has
knowledge, including the charges in the Information described in
Paragraph 1. . . . In the event that the Office determines that the
Company or Mr. Kim has breached this Agreement, the Office agrees
to provide the Company and Mr. Kim with written notice of such
breach prior to instituting any prosecution resulting from such
breach.... In the event that the Office determines that the Company
has breached this Agreement- (a) all statements made by or on behalf
of the Company to the Office or to the Court, including the
attached Statement of Facts, and any testimony given by or on
behalf of the Company before a grand jury, a court, or any
tribunal, or at any legislative hearings, whether prior or subsequent
to this Agreement, and any leads derived from such statements or
testimony, shall be admissible in evidence in any and all criminal
proceedings brought by the Office against the Company.' 6 1
Obviously, the government's ability to-unilaterally and in its
sole discretion-revoke a DPA and proceed with prosecution,
increases the leverage exercised by prosecutors.'" Indeed, one
commentator argues that the "unfairness and one-sidedness" of the
situation must surely be the product of economic duress, stating,
"There is no other reason for a corporate entity to subject itself to
the final determination of an authority that opposes its interests."'6 5

benefit, the omission of judicial oversight raises concerns when the determination of
whether there is a breach of the agreement rests within the exclusive province of one
party, and that party is the government, a party with extraordinary power.").
163. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at para. 12-14, U.S. v. Saena Tech Corp., No.
1:14-cr-00066 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 2014).
164. See Paulsen, supra note 110 at 1464; see also Greenblum, supra note 18, at 1864
("Deferral is a powerful prosecutorial tool because it is negotiated and implemented exclusively
by the prosecutor.").
165. See Matt Senko, ProsecutorialOverreaching in Deferred Prosecution Agreements,
19 S. CAL. INTERDIsC. L.J. 163, 178 (2009); see also Zierdt & Podgor , supra note 162,
at 3 ("[T]he government acquires total power over the alleged corporate offender. The
net result is that deferred prosecution agreements are reached without considering
theories of duress and unconscionability.").
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1. The 'Innocence Problem'forDPAs
This article has attempted to tease out various factors and forces
tending to cause a company to be interested in obtaining a DPA
when faced with a possible corporate criminal violation, and
economic duress might be one of those factors-especially if a
company believes, accurately or not, that indictment and/or trial
could mean the equivalent of a death sentence for the company. But
whatever the specific factors involved, the larger issue is one of
power, leverage, and fairness in a dispute resolution process involving
the government and the accused, and in that respect, there seems to
be a clear parallel between issues surrounding DPA use in resolving
corporate criminal matters, and what has come to be called the
"innocence problem" in plea bargaining more generally.
The innocence problem "is the recognition that when a
prosecutor offers a defendant the opportunity to plead guilty in
exchange for a more lenient punishment, the offer may lead an
innocent defendant to plead guilty."'" Evidence suggests that the
availability of nolo contendere 6 7 and Alford'16 pleas act as
encouraging forces upon the accused, thereby increasing the
6
likelihood that an innocent party will engage in a plea agreement.'
As one scholar notes, the innocence problem "strikes at the center of
the criminal justice system, the integrity of which depends on the
reliability of convictions." 7 1
I would suggest that being offered a DPA by a prosecutor places
a company squarely into the center of the innocence problem: the
forces described in this article can work to convince an innocent
company to accept the deal. Moreover, I disagree with the notion
that such a scenario would be likely to unfold only when a "bad
apple" prosecutor is driving such an outcome, as Thompson suggests
above. Instead, I believe a system has been created, through the
workings of the DOJ, wherein even good, honest prosecutors who
are trying to be reasonable and fair, could mistakenly decide to offer
166. See Adam N. Stern, Note, Plea Bargaining, Innocence, and the Prosecutor'sDuty to
aDojustice,"25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1027, 1027 (2012) (citation omitted).
167. In a nolo contendere or "no contest" plea, the plea is similar to a guilty plea, but
the defendant does not actually admit guilt. See Bibas, supra note 20, at 1370.
168. In an Alford plea, a defendant is permitted to plead guilty while proclaiming his or
her innocence. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970).
169. See Stern, supra note 166, at 1028.
170. See id. (citation omitted).
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a DPA to a company that has not violated the law. Furthermore, any
rationally minded company placed in that position, even if
completely innocent, might reasonably choose to accept the offer."'
In essence, then, I would argue that DPAs provide the government
with power that can potentially be unfair and exploitative in the
enforcement of corporate criminal law,1 72 and currently there do not
seem to be legal, legislative, or administrative systems or mechanisms
in place to act as a set of checks and balances upon that power.
IV. CONCLUSION

The evidence put forth in this Article suggests that DPAs serve as
a disturbing wellspring of unfairness, double standards, and potential
abuse of power. I urge Congress to pass legislation halting the
DOJ's ability to use DPAs in the context of corporate criminal law
enforcement-to formally eliminate what the DOJ refers to as the
"middle ground" between declining to prosecute on the one hand,
and trials or guilty pleas on the other.173

171. See Bohrer & Trencher, supra note 75, at 1483-84 ("With few rational business
organizations willing to risk the consequences of an indictment, in the past few years we have
seen a significant upswing in the number of investigations that culminated in a DPA.");
Golumbic & Lichy, supra note 37, at 1313 ("[T]he risk of collateral consequences of a
criminal indictment-that is, the risk of an Arthur Andersen-style collapse-leaves corporations
with no choice but to settle at all costs.") (citation omitted).
172. Indeed, I would argue that just as the prosecutor in a plea bargain serves "not only
as prosecutor but [also] as quasi-judge and jury," so too does the prosecutor in a DPA
negotiation. See Stern, supra note 166, at 1035 (2012) ("Because the judge and jury are
absent in the plea bargaining context, the prosecutor must bear the burden of avoiding
punishing the innocent. This burden is made more difficult to bear because the plea bargaining
process lacks the protections that contribute to the accuracy of trial convictions, in particular
the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, cross-examination, and witness impeachment. These
protections guard the integrity of the criminal justice process and tend to expose weaknesses in
the government's case which may not be apparent during plea bargaining. In order to comply
with the duty to do justice in plea bargaining, the prosecutor must be far more sensitive to the
possibility that the defendant is innocent than in the trial context. Making an offer that would be
so enticing as to lead the defendant to plead guilty even if were in fact innocent would clearly
be incompatible with the prosecutor's burden of heightened sensitivity.") (citations omitted)
(emphasis added); see also Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Toward a Common Law of Plea Bargaining,
102 KY. L.J. 1, 1 (2013/2014) (in discussing plea bargaining, the author describes a situation
that is nearly identical to that of a prosecutor negotiating a DPA with the accused: "The
prosecutor-judges who resolve these cases do so without necessarily referring to how any other
case was resolved and do not follow any particular procedure, formal or informal, in deciding
how to make offers. Their decisions are not subject to review and largely avoid public
scrutiny") (citations omitted).
173. See U.S. ATIORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 18; see also Greenblum, supranote 18.
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In a speech before the New York Bar Association, former
Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer stated that DPAs result in
"far greater accountability for corporate wrongdoing" than existed
before their use and that in many ways DPAs have "the same
74
punitive, deterrent, and rehabilitative effect as a guilty plea."1 Yet
evidence put forth in this Article suggests that such comparisons
cannot accurately be made, simply because we do not yet have the
ability to accurately measure the effectiveness of each tool
separately and independently (i.e., "DPA" versus "criminal
conviction"), let alone the ability to compare the crime-fighting
efficacy of these tools in order to determine whether one is
superior. Thus, it appears that the assertions made by Breuer have
not been proven to be accurate and correct.
Moreover, when faced with a possible corporate crime, what if
the government decided it would be easier, cheaper, faster, etc., to
resolve the matter using a DPA, even when the law and facts of the
case clearly indicated that the most appropriate course of action
would be immediate prosecution? Or, in another situation, what if
the government decided to use the threat of prosecution in order to
secure a DPA, even when the law and facts clearly dictated a decision
to decline any enforcement action whatsoever? 7 In both instances,
the pursuit of justice, consistency in the rule of law, and basic
76
notions of fairness would be greatly compromised.
As set forth in this Article, the reasons for prohibiting the use of
DPAs in the context of corporate criminal law enforcement are
manifold, including:
(1) DPAs make it appear that companies are essentially
buying their way out of a prosecution;
(2) Current DOJ policy gives prosecutors too much power
and discretion regarding when, why, and how agency
attorneys will (or will not) use DPAs, translating directly into

174. Breuer, supra note 12.
175. While there is no similar provision with respect to deferred prosecution agreements,
it is well understood that "[c]riminal prosecution shall not be used as a threat to obtain civil
settlement." See ENRD Directive 0802: Parallel Proceedings Policy 8 (2008).
176. See Uhlmann, supra note 7, at 1344 ("Deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
agreements, if they occur at all, should be limited to relatively minor cases ... where other
non-criminal alternatives are inadequate."). But see id. at 1342 (suggesting that DPAs should
be allowed in "exceptional cases" where the government can "demonstrate that innocent third
parties would suffer unacceptable harm").
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increased power and leverage while negotiating
agreements with alleged corporate wrongdoers;

the

(3) DPAs weaken the deterrence that comes from the threat
of criminal prosecution;
(4) In cases in which the DOJ declines to move forward with
prosecution, DPAs can be used to nevertheless extract a
'pound of flesh' from the alleged wrongdoer, when
previously the prosecutors would have been forced to walk
away with nothing;
(5) Because the government has the exclusive and nonreviewable right to determine whether a breach of the DPA
has occurred, targeted individuals and companies likely feel
a strong sense of pressure to adhere to all DOJ requests and
demands throughout the agreement's deferral period, even
if such requests and demands become unreasonable, unfair,
and unjust;
(6) Because DPAs do not involve a trial, their use forecloses
the most effective means for any criminal justice system to
rein in overly aggressive prosecutors;177 without the threat of
trial, prosecutors might be less likely to act in a manner that
is reasonable, fair, and just;
(7) Because DPAs resolve matters without trials, jury
verdicts, appellate court decisions, and without establishing
binding judicial precedent, the agreements are not
particularly useful in clarifying the boundaries of permissible
legal conduct;
(8) DPAs help explain why, in recent years, DOJ seems to be
going against its own internal charging guidelines by shifting
the focus of enforcement action from individuals to
companies and
(9) DPAs allow federal prosecutors to shift their focus toward
reforming corrupt corporate cultures and away from
indicting, prosecuting, and punishing criminal transgressors.

177. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968) ("The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary
power-to make available the commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against
the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps
overconditioned or biased response of a judge.").
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The Department of Justice is the agency responsible for
enforcing federal laws, many of which clearly define certain behaviors
as criminalin nature. It seems beyond disingenuous for the DOJ to
sometimes decide, based upon internally generated memos and
policies,17 1 to employ DPAs and thereby address potential serious
criminal violations as if they were less serious, civil violations.' After
all, the work of Congress in writing and passing federal law is
conducted through painstaking and time-consuming processes,
including countless hours of expert testimony, research and
discussion, committee and floor debate, and, finally, voting.18 0 And
the labels that Congress decides to use when putting forth various
laws-"criminal" versus "civil"-matter a great deal.""
We label matters as criminal because we, as a society, strongly
condemn the behavior and we wish to protect people from it.182
178. See U.S. ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 18 ("In certain instances, it may be appropriate,
upon consideration of the factors set forth herein, to resolve a corporate criminal case by means other
than indictment. Non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements, for example, occupy an
important middle ground between declining prosecution and obtaining the conviction of a
corporation."); see also Memorandum from the Dep't of Justice, Eric H. Holder, Deputy Attorney
1999),
available at
16,
(June
Against
Corporations
Bringing Charges
Gen.,
["Holder
http://www.justice.gov/crminal/fraud/documents/reports/1999/charging-corps.PDF
Memo"]; Memorandum from the Dep't of Justice, Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen.,
(Jan. 20, 2003), available at
Prosecution of Bus. Orgs.
Principles of Fed.
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003ja
n20_privwaiv.dojthomp.authcheckdam.pdf ["Thompson memo"]; Memorandum from the Dep't of
Justice, Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Orgs., available
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dagAegacy/2007/07/05/mcnutymemo.pdf
at
["McNulty memo"].
179. Indeed, the U.S. Attorneys' Manual states that, "Since the primary function of a
Federal prosecutor is to enforce the criminal law, he/she should not routinely or
indiscriminately enter into non-prosecution agreements, which are, in essence, agreements not
to enforce the law under particular conditions." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS'
MANUAL § 9.27.620 (emphasis added).
180. See Barbara Sinclair, Symposium the Most DisparagedBranch: The Role of Congress in
the Twenty-First Century: Panel I: Is Congress 'The Broken Branch'?: Question: What's Wrong
with Congress? Answer: It's a Democratic Legislature, 89 B.U. L. REV. 387, 397("[W]e need to
remember that what we ask of Congress is really hard; and with all its failings, it is still our
most democratic branch.").
181. See Uhlmann, supra note 7, at 1343-44 (discussing how the DOJ "prosecutes
criminally because labels matter, and we communicate far more about our condemnation of
wrongdoing when we call conduct criminal").
182. See Irwin Schwartz, Toward Improving the Law and Policy of Corporate Criminal
Liability and Sanctions, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 99 (2014) ("We prosecute criminal cases to
protect the public. By prosecuting, we seek to deter offenders, specifically and generally. We
seek recompense for victims and we recognize the public demand for 'just punishment.'")
(citations omitted).
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Part of the motive in choosing to label something "criminal" rather
than "civil" is to engender more severe public shaming, thereby
further reinforcing law-conforming standards of behavior
throughout society.' While top DOJ officials suggest that
acknowledging wrongdoing as part of a DPA agreement can, in
some measure, be similar to acknowledging wrongdoing through a
guilty plea,'14 this Article suggests that is not the case. Indeed, one
is left to wonder how much public shaming and overall
accountability are taking place through the use of DPAs when a
former federal prosecutor tells us that, "Companies are happy to
enter into these deferred prosecution agreements because it's
become so commonplace now.

. .

. They take a bath in the press for

a finite period of time. The stock markets don't even seem to
punish them."8 While the theorists tell us that punishment "must
match, or be equivalent to the wickedness of the offense," that
does not seem to be what occurs when DPAs are used.'8 6
In a speech entitled The Importance of Trials to the Law and
Public Accountability, SEC Chair Mary Jo White extolls the
virtues of trials by proclaiming, "How we [Americans] resolve
disputes and how we decide the guilt or innocence of an accused are
the true measure of our democracy." 8

7

Sadly, when the DOJ uses

DPAs to address alleged corporate crimes, it thereby fails to
decide the guilt or innocence of the accused, even though
carrying out that duty has historically been a core function of
criminal law enforcement. Using DPAs is essentially a way of
imposing a term of probation before conviction. I believe this
makes a mockery of the criminal justice system-something that
183. U.S. Department of Justice Soft on Corporate Crime, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, July
2012, at 22.
184. Breuer, supra note 12 ("[I]n many ways, a DPA has the same punitive, deterrent,
and rehabilitative effect as a guilty plea: when a company enters into a DPA with the
government ... it almost always must acknowledge wrongdoing, agree to cooperate with the
government's investigation, pay a fine, agree to improve its compliance program, and agree to
face prosecution if it fails to satisfy the terms of the agreement. All of these components of
DPAs are critical for accountability.").

185. Danielle Douglas, Royal Bank of Scotland to Pay $612 Million to Resolve Libor Case, THE
WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2013, available athttp://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/rbs-

to-pay-612m-to-resolve-libor-case/2013/02/06/2cOcc42c-6fd3-1 1e2-aa58243de81040ba story.html. (emphasis added).
186. Hugo Adam Bedau, Retributionand the Theory of Punidanent,75 J. PHiL. 601,602 (1878).
187.

Mary Jo White, Chairwoman, Sec. & Exchange Comm'n, 5th Annual Judge

Thomas A. Flannery Lecture, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 14, 2013) (emphasis added).
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cannot be fixed through reform ideas such as additional
legislative'" or judicial" 9 oversight of the current system.
DPAs provide a useful and productive tool to quickly, cheaply,
and efficiently dispose of cases involving low-level, first-time, mostly
juvenile offenders of misdemeanor crimes-the category of people
90
and crimes for whom the tool was created in the early 1900s.1
Clearly, DPAs were neither designed nor intended for the disposition
of potentially serious criminal law matters involving sophisticated
corporate entities and the white collar professionals engaged in
running those entities.
Federal Appeals Court Judge Harry T. Edwards told us nearly
thirty years ago that settling matters through alternative dispute
resolution is not always "fairand just,"l9' and I believe the judge's
warning certainly applies to the use of DPAs in the corporate
criminal context. Given that "the primary function of federal
prosecutors is to enforce the criminal law,"1 92 and, furthermore,
given DOJ's admission that DPA-type agreements "are, in essence,
93
agreements not to enforce the law under particular conditions,"' it is
somewhat astounding that the DOJ leadership has, in the last two
decades, permitted DPAs to become such a common and routine
manner of addressing corporate wrongdoing.

188. See, e.g., Ved P. Nanda, CorporateCriminal Liability in the United States: Is a New
Approach Warranted?, 58 Am. J. Comp. L. 605, 627-28 (2010) (discussing the
"Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act," legislation introduced in the U.S. House of
Representatives in 2009 and again in 2014, requiring the Attorney General to set forth written
guidelines concerning DPAs and NPAs).
189. See Anthony S. Barkow & Matthew D. Cipolla, Increased Judicial Scrutiny of
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 20, 2013 (discussing a study wherein "a
majority of prosecutors, company representatives, independent monitors and judges
interviewed reported more disadvantages than advantages to increased judicial involvement in
the DPA process .... Some respondents believed DPAs to be sufficiently analogous to plea
discussions such that Rule 11 barred substantive judicial oversight. Others raised broader
constitutional concerns, particularly related to separation of powers. They contend that the
decision to enter into a DPA and to shape its contents are executive rather than judicial
functions, and changes made by a judge would interfere with prosecutorial discretion").
190. Xian, supra note 26, at 643 (discussing how DPAs, in their "original capacity," were
limited to non-serious, first-time misdemeanor charges such as marijuana possession and retail
theft, especially if committed by a juvenile).
191. Harry T. Edwards, Commentary: Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or
Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REv. 668, 679 (1986).
192. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL §9.27.620, supra note 179.
193. Id. (emphasis added).
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It is time to end this failed experiment in alternative dispute
resolution. And in the end, if DPAs are not eradicated as a tool of
corporate criminal law enforcement, perhaps we can at least change
their name to something that more accurately describes the benefit
that the vast majority of recipients obtain through their current use:
Avoiding Prosecution Agreements (APAs). Individuals and
companies avoid prosecution, and the rest of America pays a certain
and costly price for that avoidance. Justice deferred for a select group
of individuals and companies means justice denied for the rest of us.
Some readers will surely ask, "But if Congress eliminates DPAs in
the corporate criminal context, what will replace them?" Nothing
need replace them. Rather, the two choices that were available to
prosecutors before DPAs arrived on the scene-namely, prosecution
or declination-were, and still are, more than adequate to address
potential violations. As in every other area of criminal law, the
defendant facing prosecution would then decide to put the
government to its burden of proof at trial, or the defendant would
decide to opt for a plea bargain (I imagine most defendants would
opt for the latter, given that ninety-five percent of all federal criminal
cases, and well over ninety percent of cases involving organizational
defendants, are currently resolved through guilty pleas).19 4 Moreover,

it is clear that the advantages currently flowing from the use of DPAs
could also be achieved through plea bargaining, including (1) quick
and efficient payment of restitution to victims; (2) requiring
companies to cooperate with the government in the prosecution of
culpable individuals within their respective organizations; (3)
requiring companies to implement (or augment) internal ethics
and/or compliance programs; and (4) providing guidance to other
companies on what constitutes improper conduct, or what
constitutes conduct that "crosses the line" in the eyes of the DOJ.195
Of course, proponents of deferred prosecution might, at this
point, turn to the one remaining argument favoring DPAs over plea
bargaining: Namely, that using DPAs can avoid the collateral
consequences that sometimes flow from conviction by trial or plea

194. See O'SULLIVAN, supra note 10.

&

195. See Statement of Gary G. Grindler, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen. for the Criminal
Div., U. S. Dep't of Justice, Accountability, Transparency, and Uniformity in Corporate
Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial
Admin. Law, 111" Cong. , 5-6 (2009) (discussing the advantages that flow from the use of
DPAs in addressing corporate criminal matters).
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bargain, as discussed at length above. However, this Article strongly
suggests not only that the existence and severity of collateral
consequences have heretofore been exaggerated, but also that such
consequences can and should be addressed by the policies, processes,
rules, and regulations of institutions other than the DOJ, and by
individuals other than prosecutors. In the end, the fear of and/or
potential for collateral consequences should not have the power to
persuade the DOJ and federal prosecutors to turn to the less fairand
less just alternative dispute resolution vehicle of DPAs to address
potential corporate criminal wrongdoing.
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